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 Does Phenomenology Ground 
Mental Content? 
 A da m   Pau t z  
 Fortunately for the determinate character of intentional 
 content, content determinacy is ﬁ xed phenomenally. 
 —Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2007) 
 Many go in for the  reductive externalist program  concerning the mind and its 
intentionality. For instance, many have said that at least some beliefs have 
their contents because their neural realizers bear an appropriate physical rela-
tion to certain external conditions. We might call the relevant relation the 
 tracking relation , leaving open whether it is to be explained in terms of causal 
covariation under optimal conditions (Stalnaker, Tye), asymmetric dependence 
(Fodor), indicator function (Dretske), or normal conditions for the proper func-
tion of output systems (Millikan). 1 
 Many extend the same model to the phenomenal side of the mind. h ey accept 
 intentionalism about experience: the phenomenology of an experience is deter-
mined by its intentional content. And they think the content of experience, like 
the content of belief, is ﬁ xed by tracking relations to the environment. h e result 
is  phenomenal externalism: the phenomenology of experience is not ﬁ xed by what 
happens in the brain, but by what environmental states the brain tracks. 2 
 h e reductive externalist program faces many long-standing problems of 
detail. Among them are the disjunction problem, the distance (depth) prob-
lem, and problems about content determinacy due to Quine and Kripkenstein. 3 
Indeed Lycan (2009: note 1) has recently spoken of the “dismal failure” of all 
existing proposals within the reductive externalist program, suggesting that 
this provides the best argument for a non-reductive approach to the mind. I 
agree. h e reductive externalist program is in a state of stagnation. 
 Recently an alternative approach has come to the fore, the  phenomenal inten-
tionality program . h is program gives a sense of revolution, of upsetting the 
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applecart. A number of ideas are loosely associated with it. First,  prioritism: 
phenomenology is “explanatorily prior to” intentionality. Indeed, Horgan and 
Tienson (2002: 520) deﬁ ne “phenomenal intentionality” as intentionality that 
is possessed “in virtue of” phenomenology, where this stands for a relation of 
explanatory priority. So, for instance, sensory experience is richly intentional, 
and its intentionality is grounded in its phenomenology. Second,  phenomenal 
internalism: roughly, phenomenology, and hence phenomenal intentionality, 
is internally determined. h is is supposed to be intuitively obvious. In con-
sequence, the reductive externalist program is a non-starter. For instance, an 
accidental, life-long “brain in a vat” might have a rich phenomenal life and 
stand in various intentional relations to various (false) intentional contents, 
even though its states do not have the function of tracking the environment. 
h ird,  phenomenal liberalism: in addition to sensory phenomenology, there is 
such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. And, just as sensory phenomenology 
grounds the content of sensory experience, cognitive phenomenology helps 
ground the content of cognitive states. h is is supposed to ﬁ nally solve the 
long-standing problems raised by Quine, Kripkenstein, and others concerning 
content determinacy. 
 If one wanted a single slogan for the phenomenal intentionality program, 
it might be  phenomenology ﬁ rst or maybe  consciousness ﬁ rst . 4 h e core thesis is 
that phenomenology plays a foundational role in grounding all intentionality. 
As for the nature of phenomenology itself, proponents of the program have had 
very little to say. For instance, they have not said whether it is possible to pro-
vide a reductive  internalist theory of phenomenology and intentionality, which 
can be put in the place of standard reductive externalist (“tracking”) theories. 
h ey tend to ignore the whole hard problem of naturalizing the mind. While 
the externalist program is reductive, the phenomenal intentionality program 
might go best with a non-reductive approach. 
 In general, my own views fall within the vague boundaries of the phenom-
enal intentional program. While I think that the speciﬁ c theses associated with 
the phenomenal intentionality program are very underdeveloped and poorly 
motivated, I also think that there are defensible theses in the vicinity. 5 In this 
chapter, I will be focused on one thesis in particular, the thesis that “cognitive 
phenomenology” might help ground mental content. First (§1–2) I will argue 
that this thesis is very underdeveloped and poorly motivated. h en (§3) I will 
develop several arguments against it. (Here I will address the largely ignored 
issue of whether phenomenal intentionality might be naturalized.) Finally 
(§4), I will defend a claim in the same vicinity. On my view, it is  sensory phe-
nomenology, not “cognitive phenomenology,” that is the source of all determi-
nate intentionality. To explain how, I will draw on some of David Lewis’s ideas 
concerning intentionality. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/12/12, NEWGEN
11_Kriegel_Ch11.indd   195 10/12/2012   9:29:57 PM
p h e n o m e n a l  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y196
 1.  Preliminaries: Cognitive Phenomenology 
 To begin with, I clarify the thesis that I will criticize, namely, the thesis that  cog-
nitive phenomenology plays an important role in grounding mental content. 
 Consider an example due to Horgan and Tienson (2002). You hear “Visiting 
relatives can be boring” ﬁ rst as a remark about the people who are visiting and 
then as a remark about visiting certain people oneself. Horgan and Tienson 
say that the actual sound or auditory imagery may be the same, but the total 
experiences are phenomenally diﬀ erent. h ey conclude that the two occurrent 
beliefs diﬀ er in  non-sensory phenomenology . Let  cognitive phenomenology be the 
phenomenology (if such there be) that attaches to beliefs and other intentional 
states that is  distinct from associated sensory phenomenology, where sensory 
phenomenology is understood broadly to include perceptual, bodily, imagistic, 
and emotional phenomenology. Horgan and Tienson say (2002: 522) that cog-
nitive phenomenology is quite rich: “Change either the attitude-type (believ-
ing, desiring, wondering, hoping, etc.) or the particular intentional content, 
and the phenomenal character thereby changes too.” So, for instance, they 
believe in a special non-sensory,  conative phenomenology that helps individuate 
our desires. (I will use “cognitive phenomenology” broadly, so that it also covers 
conative phenomenology.) Call the minimal thesis that there is such a thing as 
cognitive phenomenology  the CP-existence thesis. h is thesis has been widely 
discussed (see Montague 2010 for a helpful overview). 
 Many put forward a second, much stronger thesis about cognitive phenom-
enology that has not been widely discussed. It will be my primary focus. Here 
are some representative passages: 
 How can [cognitive] experience ever deliver determinateness? It just 
can. Cognitive experience in causal context can do just this. Such is 
its power. (When it comes to [thinking of] the number 2, it doesn’t 
even require causal context.) . . . If God could look into my mind and 
apprehend the cognitive [phenomenology] of my experience he would 
certainly know what I was thinking about, given that he also knew—
and how could he not—about my causal circumstances. It is the same 
power that makes it the case that I can think determinately about the 
number 2 although there is no relevant causal context.  Pﬀ f! h is is the 
correct account of how it is that content can be determinate in spite of 
all the problems raised for this idea by Kripke in his book  Wittgenstein 
on Rules and Private Language. (Strawson 2010: 351, 354) 
 h e part of what is thought that is fully determined by [cognitive] phe-
nomenal character [is] a kind of thought content. (Siewert 2011) 
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 [E]ach speciﬁ c occurrent intentional state with phenomenal inten-
tional content is constitutively determined by its own distinct phe-
nomenal character—viz., the what-it’s-like of undergoing that 
particular attitude-type vis- à -vis that particular phenomenal inten-
tional content . . . Suppose that you are now undergoing a psychological 
state with the distinctive [non-sensory] phenomenal what-it’s-like of 
believing that a picture is hanging crooked on a wall directly behind 
you. h en you thereby believe that there is a picture hanging crooked 
on a wall directly behind you; undergoing this phenomenology consti-
tutively determines that you are instantiating that belief-state. Any 
experiencing creature [e. g. a brain in a vat] undergoing this phenom-
enology would thereby instantiate the belief-state, even if its overall 
phenomenology is otherwise quite diﬀ erent from your own. (Horgan 
and Tienson 2002: 526) 
 Physically and apart from phenomenology, there is no “one, deter-
minate, right answer” to the question of what is the content of an 
intentional state. For . . . the content of each mental state is not deter-
minately ﬁ xed once the physical facts (including perhaps physical facts 
about the internal-environmental linkages) are ﬁ xed. Fortunately, 
however, for the identity or determinate character of intentional 
content, content identity or determinacy is ﬁ xed phenomenally. For 
example, the what-it’s-like of thinking “Lo, a rabbit” is diﬀ erent from 
the what-it’s-like of thinking “Lo, a collection of undetached rabbit 
parts” . . . [h is] commitment to phenomenal individuation of inten-
tional content, combined with rejection of physical individuation, 
[might be] tantamount to dualism. (Graham, Horgan and Tienson 
2007: 476, 481) 
 You know what you are thinking and what you mean by your utter-
ance, and there is a determinate fact of the matter about what you are 
thinking and what you mean by your utterance, because there is some-
thing it is like to think a determinate thought and to make an utter-
ance that expresses that thought. Developing in detail our proposed 
account of content determinacy is . . . an agenda item for the future. 
(Horgan and Graham 2010) 
 [My view] maintains that the intentional content of a thought is deter-
mined by its  intrinsic phenomenal properties,  not its relational proper-
ties . My teachers will be very disappointed in me. (Pitt 2009: note 5, 
my italics) 
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 Let a  cognitive phenomenal property be a property of individuals of the form 
 having a state with such-and-such cognitive phenomenology . All of the quoted phi-
losophers apparently endorse the following  CP-determination thesis: for at least 
some cognitive phenomenal properties  P , there is a unique content  c such that 
it is  metaphysically necessary that, if an individual simply has  P , then he has an 
occurrent belief (or desire) with content  c . 6 
 Now this idea is not new. Kripke (1982: 42) took it seriously. But he com-
pared cognitive experiences to mere “raw feels” or bits of “mental paint,” like 
undirected depression. Against this, CP-determination says that they have 
built-in intentionality, just as perceptual experiences arguably have built-in 
intentionality. 
 Let me make some clariﬁ cations. First, CP-determination is only meant to 
apply to our  occurrent beliefs (also sometimes called  thoughts or  judgments ) and 
our  occurrent desires . It cannot be applied to our unconscious, standing beliefs 
and desires, which certainly lack phenomenology. To explain such beliefs and 
desires, the proponent of CP-determination needs a diﬀ erent account (for some 
options see Graham, Horgan, and Tienson 2007). h is will not concern us here. 
Second, on the assumption that it is “intrinsic,” cognitive phenomenology of 
course cannot determine the “wide contents” of our beliefs and desires which 
can diﬀ er between internal duplicates: natural kind contents (for example, 
about water or rabbits), singular contents (for example, contents involving a 
particular river), and so on. Consequently, proponents of CP-determination 
typically only claim that cognitive phenomenology determines the  narrow 
(and perhaps “centered,”  de se ) contents of beliefs and desires that do not diﬀ er 
between such duplicates. In this category they include mathematical contents 
(Strawson mentions contents about the number 2), certain general descriptive 
 de se contents (the watery stuﬀ  of my acquaintance is wet), artifactual con-
tents (Horgan and Tienson mention a content about a picture), and so on. To 
explain  wide content, Horgan and Tienson (2002) adopt David Lewis’s (1994) 
view that wide content is derivative from narrow content and relations to the 
environment. 
 h e approach taken by proponents of the CP-determination thesis is inter-
esting, for two reasons. First, it is unorthodox. h e puzzle of intentionality can 
be put like this:  how is it that one manages to stand in intentional relations to some 
contents rather than others? (Here and I assume that to have a particular belief 
or desire is to stand in the belief relation or the desire relation to a particular 
proposition or “content.”) According to orthodoxy:
 h e contents of the (occurrent and non-occurrent) beliefs and desires of a • 
subject are always determined by features of the subject that go beyond his 
intrinsic properties at the time he has those beliefs and desires: factors such 
as environment-involving behavioral dispositions, tracking relations to the 
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environment, causal or inferential relations among internal states, what 
sentences he accepts and their contents as determined by their overall pat-
tern of use in the language, and so on. 
 Granted, many philosophers, for instance David Lewis and Frank Jackson, do 
recognize a notion of non-Twin-Earthable “narrow content.” But Lewis and 
Jackson repeatedly emphasize that, on their weak notion of “narrow content,” 
having a mental state with a particular narrow content is  not entirely intrinsic, 
because narrow contents are determined by the typical  world-involving func-
tional roles of your internal states in your population, which are not intrinsic. 7 
 By contrast, proponents of CP-determination typically accept the radical 
 phenomenal internalism associated with the phenomenal intentionality pro-
gram: all phenomenal properties (and hence cognitive phenomenal properties) 
are  intrinsic , and hence non-functional, properties of individuals (see the quote 
from Pitt, and also Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2004). (h is is not obliga-
tory: as we shall see in §3.1, one  could accept the CP-determination thesis but 
reject the intrinsicness thesis.) When this is combined with CP-determination, 
we get:
 Some of a subject’s occurrent beliefs and desires have contents that are fully • 
determined by certain of his  intrinsic properties at the time he has those 
occurrent beliefs and desires (namely, cognitive phenomenal properties), 
where the relevant intrinsic properties are  distinct from all of his sensory 
and functional properties (past, present and future). 
 h ere is a second reason that the CP-determination thesis is interesting: 
many declare that it ﬁ nally solves content determinacy worries due to Quine 
and Kripkenstein. 
 Here is a rough formulation of the Kripkenstein problem as it arises for 
physicalists. Let quus 
1
 , quus 
2
 , quus 
3
 denote diﬀ erent functions deﬁ ned over 
numbers that are just like the plus function but that diﬀ er from the plus func-
tion only when it comes to numbers that are too large for us to compute. h en, 
at least if we set aside the widely rejected view that necessarily equivalent prop-
ositions are identical, there are inﬁ nitely many distinct contents up in Plato’s 
heaven: that two plus two equals four, that two quus 
1
 two equals four, that 
two quus 
2
 two equals four, that two quus 
3
 two equals four, and so on. If we 
say that the non-intentionally characterized functional and behavioral facts 
determine (in the sense of  metaphysically necessitate ) that one believes one of 
these contents (in particular,  that two plus two equals four ) to the exclusion of 
all the others, then we want some kind of  explanation for this.  How do these 
facts  select or  point to that  particular content to be what you believe? Is there a 
physicalist-functionalist (perhaps a posteriori) account of the belief relation 
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that  explains how the physical facts determine that this is the content you 
believe, as opposed to the other candidates? In my view, the main problem here 
is the  problem of ﬁ nitude . We have (non-intentionally characterizable) disposi-
tions involving a certain ﬁ nite set of numerals in language (and perhaps in the 
language of thought) but we do not have dispositions involving numerals that 
are too long for us to compute. Quine’s well-known problem about rabbits and 
undetached rabbit-parts is similar to the Kripkenstein problem. 
 In the passages cited earlier, Strawson as well as Graham, Horgan, and 
Tienson declare that in such cases cognitive phenomenology saves the day: 
 somehow it manages to determine what content you believe. 
 h e CP-determination thesis is underdeveloped. One does not get much 
more than the bare assertion that cognitive phenomenology determines con-
tent. h is leaves many obvious questions unanswered. What exactly is the 
relationship between cognitive phenomenal properties and intentional prop-
erties? What is the relationship between cognitive phenomenal properties and 
physical-functional properties? Is phenomenal intentionality a natural phe-
nomenon? I will be looking at these questions. 
 I will argue that,  even if the CP-existence thesis is true, the stronger and 
more interesting CP-determination thesis is not. Along the way I will present 
some novel reasons to doubt the CP-existence thesis as well. 
 2.  
 e CP-Determination 
 esis as Unmotivated 
 Let us ﬁ rst look at arguments  for the CP-determination thesis. Contrary to some 
proponents, it is not introspectively  obvious , since many reject it. I will consider 
two arguments for CP-determination, suggesting that they fall short. 
 2.1.  First Argument: 
 e Determinacy Argument 
 In several places, Graham, Horgan, and Tienson have brieﬂ y argued for 
CP-determination on the grounds that it provides the  only adequate solution to 
the determinacy problems due Quine and Kripkenstein, as follows:
 1  Against Quine and Kripkenstein, there generally are determinate facts 
about what we believe and mean. 
 2  But Quine and Kripkenstein are right that such facts could not be “determi-
nately ﬁ xed by” the physical facts. 
 3  If premise 2 is true, then there could be determinate facts about what we 
believe and mean only if they are ﬁ xed by  non-sensory, cognitive phenom-
enology: this is the only alternative to physical determination. 
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 4  So, there could be determinate facts about what we believe and mean only if 
they are ﬁ xed by cognitive phenomenology. (2, 3) 
 5  So, what we believe and mean is ﬁ xed by cognitive phenomenology. (1, 4) 8 
 h ere are several problems with this argument. 
 (i) Against premise 2, there are numerous important physicalist answers to 
Quine and Kripkenstein’s arguments in the literature on “naturalizing inten-
tionality.” But Graham, Horgan, and Tienson do not provide an in-principle 
reason to think that all they fail, nor do they eliminate them one by one. 
 (ii) In support of premise 3, Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2009: 531) 
say that if we “[agree] with Quinean misgivings about the physical determi-
nation of content, then all that’s left as a mode of individuation is phenom-
enological individuation.” From the examples they discuss (they speak of the 
what-it’s-like of thinking “Lo, a rabbit”) it is clear they mean  cognitive phe-
nomenology and not mere  sensory phenomenology; and Horgan and Graham 
(2010) explicitly say that cognitive phenomenology over and above sensory 
phenomenology is needed to secure our actual level of content determinacy. 
Otherwise they do not have an argument from determinacy for  cognitive 
phenomenology. 
 But they largely ignore certain views on which  sensory phenomenology is an 
important source of content determinacy. On some views, sensory phenomenol-
ogy is  richly intentional (for example, essentially involves the representation of 
observational properties), but its intentionality is  not reducible to purely physi-
cal facts (Pautz 2010a; Chalmers 2006). Further, our actual and potential sen-
sory experiences, together with the functional facts, are enough to secure our 
actual level of content determinacy. h e proponent of this view shares Quine’s 
misgivings about the physical determination of content in a sense: he agrees 
that facts about determinate content are not ﬁ xed merely by the third-person 
physical facts—for instance, non-intentionally characterizable behavioral and 
functional facts. But he denies that the only alternative to austere physicalism 
involves the appeal to  non-sensory ,  cognitive phenomenology. Later (in §4) I will 
recommend this view as an alternative to CP-determination. 
 How could Graham, Horgan, and Tienson show that this view is wrong, and 
that they are right in maintaining that  cognitive phenomenology over and above 
sensory phenomenology is needed to secure the level of content determinacy that 
our intentional states actually possess? h ey would need to show that a commu-
nity which is  exactly like us in all physical respects  and all actual and dispositional 
 sensory respects (same sensory experiences with their built-in intentionality, 
same language, etc.), but which lacks the occasional extra bits of “cognitive phe-
nomenology” that we allegedly enjoy (an  absent cognitive qualia case ), would dif-
fer profoundly from us in having intentional states whose contents are  much less 
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determinate than the contents of our actual intentional states . h ey would have to 
show that  sensory-functional supervenience fails: total intentional facts about a 
population fail to supervene on the total sensory and functional facts about that 
population. (Uriah Kriegel asked me whether such an absent cognitive qualia 
case is  nomically possible. But for the point I am making the case only needs to be 
metaphysically possible, and in §3.2 I will argue that it is.) But Graham, Horgan, 
and Tienson have certainly not shown this or even addressed the supervenience 
issue. How  could they show this? Later on I will argue that the sensory-functional 
supervenience thesis is actually correct (§§3.2–3.3). 
 (iii) In maintaining that the only alternative to physical determination is 
determination by cognitive phenomenology (premise 3), Horgan and Tienson 
ignore yet another option, one that is historically well known. As Boghossian 
(1989: 542) notes, Brentano’s thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idioms 
answers Kripkenstein and secures content determinacy but does not require 
cognitive phenomenology. So considerations concerning content determinacy 
alone simply do not justify acceptance of CP-determination at all. Horgan and 
Tienson cannot object to primitivism. As we will see (§3.1), their own brief 
remarks suggest a primitivist (or, as they themselves say in the passage cited 
earlier, “dualist”) view of content determinacy. 
 (iv) Finally, against premise 1, one might say that, while perhaps some of our 
beliefs clearly determinately possess certain contents (for example, immediate 
perceptual beliefs) thanks to having an especially close connection to sensory 
experience, other beliefs (beliefs about electrons, arithmetical beliefs) must be 
admitted to be radically indeterminate in content. 
 In response, Horgan and Graham (2010) would claim that in general con-
tent determinacy “is just obvious,” even though Quine and many others have 
rejected it. But how can introspection deliver  certainty concerning this dis-
puted, highly theoretical issue? Further, according to Horgan and Graham, 
in the  absent cognitive qualia case mentioned earlier, when their own coun-
terparts (sensory-functional duplicates) say (just as Horgan and Graham 
do) that “in general there is content determinacy,” their counterparts are 
giving expression to a false introspective belief, for their counterparts in 
this case lack the cognitive qualia which, according to them, are necessary 
for securing general content determinacy. So by their own lights introspec-
tion is  highly fallible when it comes to the highly theoretical issue of content 
determinacy. 
 2.2.  Second Argument: 
 e Access Argument 
 Very roughly, the ﬁ rst premise of this argument—defended for instance by Pitt 
(2011)—is that one has some kind of “special access” to one’s occurrently believ-
ing or desiring that  p . h e second premise is that this requires that occurrently 
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believing or desiring that  p have an “individuative” cognitive phenomenology, 
in a sense that entails CP-determination. 
 But there are two problems with the second premise of this interesting argu-
ment. First, many accounts of special access do not require CP-determination. 
Indeed, even Pitt’s  own theory—which a kind of  direct acquaintance theory —does 
not require that our occurrent thoughts be phenomenal states. h ere is nothing 
in the notion of acquaintance that demands that we are only acquainted with 
phenomenal states. Russell (1912: 105) explicitly allowed for acquaintance 
with non-phenomenal states, for instance  two plus two equaling four . So what 
exactly is the argument against a view on which our occurrent thoughts are 
 non-phenomenal states but we have immediate, acquaintance-based knowledge of 
them? 9 Many other accounts of special access do not require CP-determination 
(for example, Byrne 2011, Carruthers 2011). Pitt criticizes  some of these mod-
els. But (although I cannot discuss this here) I think his criticisms are not deci-
sive. Further, he does not eliminate all possible models. 
 A second problem is this. Consider once again the  absent cognitive qualia case . 
It is exactly like the actual case in all respects (sensory, perceptual, functional, 
physical) except that our counterparts lack cognitive qualia. h e second prem-
ise of the access argument has a very radical consequence: that in this case our 
counterparts  could not enjoy the same kind of special, non-inferential access 
to occurrent beliefs and desires that we enjoy. But there are reasons to reject 
this consequence. To begin with, they clearly have occurrent beliefs and desires 
with  some contents, despite lacking cognitive phenomenology. (Whether their 
contents are just as “determinate” as the contents of our beliefs and desires 
does not matter to the point I am trying to make here, namely, that special 
access to content doesn’t  in general require CP-determination.) h ey are not 
cognitive zombies. So, for instance, suppose my counterpart, like me, currently 
has an experience of a round tomato; the sentence “that’s a round tomato” runs 
through his inner speech and he also assents to this sentence in public speech; 
and he manifests understanding this sentence just as I do. Suppose he also has 
strong hunger pangs, imagines food, and has experiences of seeking food; the 
sentence “food would be good” runs through his inner speech and he assents to 
this sentence in public speech; and he manifests understanding this sentence 
just as I do. No one competent with the concepts of belief and desire would 
deny that, like me, he  believes a round tomato is present and that he  desires 
food; and there is no  theory-neutral reason to deny these things. Moreover, like 
me, without having to go through any conscious process of inference, my coun-
terpart assents to the sentences “I believe that’s a round tomato” and “I desire 
food” and exhibits full understanding of these sentences and mastery of the 
concepts of belief and desire. So no one would deny that he also has  introspec-
tive beliefs about his belief and desire. Now these introspective beliefs have all 
the earmarks of knowledge; they are, for instance, non-accidentally true. What 
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reason is there to deny that they constitute knowledge? Perhaps it will be said 
that from my counterpart’s point of view these introspective beliefs pop up 
“out of the blue” (as in familiar cases of unwitting reliability discussed by epis-
temologists). As against this, they are quite in line with his experiential life, 
for instance, his inner speech and experienced behavior. h e conclusion I draw 
is that my counterpart also has immediate access to his beliefs and desires, 
despite his lack of “cognitive phenomenology.” Special access doesn’t require 
cognitive phenomenology. 
 3.  Against CP-Determination 
 No convincing argument for the CP-determination thesis has yet been pro-
vided. I will now develop several arguments against it. 
 3.1.  First Argument: 
 e Danglers Argument 
 My ﬁ rst argument is that there are reasons to interpret proponents of 
CP-determination as “anti-reductionists” or “primitivists” about cognitive phe-
nomenology and hence cognitive intentionality. h ey accept what is sometimes 
called  Brentano’s thesis (Quine 1960: 221). But, if they reject reductionism and 
accept primitivism, they need brute principles or “danglers” (Smart 1959) con-
necting cognitive phenomenology with mainstream physical properties. 
 Let me ﬁ rst argue in some detail for the “primitivist” interpretation. According 
to proponents of CP-determination, what is the  nature of cognitive phenomenology, 
such that it delivers determinate content? h ey never say. h ey  might take a reduc-
tive physicalist view of cognitive phenomenology and phenomenal intentionality 
in general. Here I understand reductive views broadly to include views that  iden-
tify mental properties with physical properties and physically realized functional 
properties. h ere are two types of reductive physicalist theories of  sensory phenom-
enology:  biological theories and  functional theories . Proponents of CP-determination 
might apply the same reductive theories to cognitive phenomenology, thereby 
avoiding the need to postulate brute principles or “danglers” to explain its presence 
in the world. But there is reason to think that they would not. 
 To see this, consider ﬁ rst a  biological theory of cognitive phenomenology, 
akin to the familiar biological (type-type identity) theory of sensory phe-
nomenology. To illustrate, let  P be the non-sensory phenomenal property you 
allegedly possess when you occurrently believe that two plus two equals four 
on a certain occasion. On the biological theory of cognitive phenomenology, 
 P is  necessarily identical with the  intrinsic neuro-computational property  M, 
which has its connections with the external world and behavioral outputs 
only  contingently . 
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 h is might be the  only naturalistic theory compatible with the radical phe-
nomenal internalism favored by friends of the phenomenal intentionality 
program, according to which phenomenal properties are  intrinsic properties of 
individuals. 
 Let  biological CP-determination be the conjunction of CP-determination and 
the biological theory of cognitive phenomenology. h is conjunction entails 
that, for some narrow (non-Twin-Earthable) beliefs and desires with content  c , 
there is a single neural state that metaphysically necessitates having a belief or 
desire content  c . For instance, on CP-determination, having cognitive phenom-
enal property  P determines  as a matter of metaphysical necessity believing  two 
plus two equals four . On the biological theory of cognitive phenomenology,  P is 
necessarily identical with neuro-computational property  M . Hence, according 
to biological CP-determination, merely having the mere neuro-computational 
property  M determines as a matter of metaphysical necessity believing  two plus 
two equals four . Another neural property metaphysically necessitates believing 
 there is a picture on the wall behind oneself . And so on. Of course, the biologi-
cal theory might also be applied to  sensory intentionality. Maybe, for instance, 
there is a neural property that necessitates being  visually acquainted with the 
general property  roundness (Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2004). 
 Might proponents of CP-determination accept biological CP-determination? 
Is the biological theory a plausible model for “naturalizing” phenomenal inten-
tionality? I think not. 
 First, belief and other standard intentional states must be taken to be  rela-
tions to intentional contents or properties or other abstract objects. h ose 
attracted to non-relational accounts of intentionality (for example, Kriegel 
2011: chap. 3) have not answered the very strong arguments for the standard 
relational view (for example, Schiﬀ er 2006). So, for instance, the proponent of 
biological CP-determination must recognize the existence of a two-place belief 
relation  B 
n
 that we bear to “narrow contents.” 
 Now the proponent of biological CP-determination already reduces 
 monadic cognitive phenomenal properties to monadic neuro-computational 
properties. So he doesn’t need brute laws or “danglers” to explain the correla-
tions between  these properties. Could he also provide a reductive account of 
the  dyadic relation  B 
n
 ? Could he identify it with some dyadic physical or func-
tional relation between individuals and narrow contents (abstract objects), 
such that what contents you bear this relation to ( two plus two is four ,  there is 
a picture on the wall , etc.) are somehow ﬁ xed merely by your intrinsic neural 
properties? 
 h e same problem arises concerning other intentional relations. Horgan, 
Tienson, and Graham (2004: 304–305) claim that there are many existing 
things (for instance, abstract objects like numbers and general properties like 
 being a picture or  being round ) such that your  thinking about them is ﬁ xed simply 
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by your narrow, intrinsic neutral properties. Might they provide a reductive 
account of this narrow thinking-about relation,  T 
n
 ? 
 h is is a huge problem, but elsewhere I have argued that the answer is “No.” 10 
To appreciate the argument, consider that biological CP-determination has the 
consequence that an accidental, isolated brain-in-a-vat might bear the rela-
tion  T 
n
 to the number four, the property of being a picture, the property of 
being round, and so on. But by stipulation it does not bear the usual tracking, 
behavioral, or other  physical relations to these entities, which are appealed to in 
all existing naturalistic theories. How then could  T 
n
 be a physical relation? If 
we conﬁ ne ourselves to intrinsic neural features (ﬁ ring rates, causal relations 
among uninterpreted mentalese sentences) and do not appeal to relations to 
the environment and behavior to pin down content, then a reduction is out of 
the question. h ere is no general algorithm, applying to all actual or possible 
individuals, that goes merely from these intrinsic features to what items (prop-
erties like shapes, mathematical objects) an individual is thinking 
N
 of and what 
narrow contents he believes 
N
 . So the defender of biological CP-determination 
must take  T 
n
 and  B 
n
 to be  primitive relations , thus frustrating his reductive ambi-
tions. A corollary of this is that he would have to accept “brute necessities.” He 
wouldn’t after all avoid the kind of “modal danglers” that type-type identity 
is designed to avoid (Smart 1959). For instance, he would have to say that it 
is brute necessity that neural duplicates must bear the primitive intentional 
relations  B 
n
 and  T 
n
 to the same contents ( two plus two is four ,  there is a picture on 
the wall ) and other abstract objects (numbers, general properties). 11 And it is 
just a brute (and fortunate) fact that they bear these relations to  plus -contents 
rather than “bent,”  quus -like contents, so that there is no interesting solution 
to Kripkenstein puzzle. It is not merely that he would have to say that these 
necessities are brute in the  epistemic sense that they are not a priori knowable 
(most physicalists accept such epistemic bruteness). He would have to say that 
they are brute in a more objectionable metaphysical sense (roughly along the 
lines of Dorr 2007): they cannot be derived from any more basic modal truths. 
 h ere is another problem. Biological CP-determination is open to what we 
might call the “separation argument.” (Pautz (2010c: sect. 4) develops the same 
line of argument against biological theories of  sensory intentionality.) According 
to biological CP-determination, having the mere neuro-computational prop-
erty  M metaphysically necessitates believing that two plus two equals four. 
Against this, there are possible “separation cases” in which  M (perhaps just 
a bit of brain-writing in the “cognitive phenomenology” center of the brain) 
is totally functionally isolated and plays no interesting functional role with 
respect to experiencing collections of objects and the experience of counting 
objects, imagery, and so on (cf. the “baby case” in §3.2). h ere are also worlds 
in which it plays such a functional role, but one appropriate to a quite diﬀ er-
ent arithmetical belief (for example,  ﬁ ve plus ﬁ ve equals ten ). In these cases 
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 M is “separated from” its actual sensory-functional role. It would be absurd 
to suggest that in these possible cases  M realizes believing  that two plus two 
equals four . So, contrary to biological CP-determination, possessing the mere 
neuro-computational property  M does not  metaphysically necessitate believing 
that two plus two equals four. 
 So those who favor CP-determination should not accept biological 
CP-determination for the simple reason that it is bad theory. Against biological 
CP-determination, most think that it is the connections our internal neural 
states bear to the world and behavior that link them to some contents and not 
others. Accordingly, the friend of CP-determination might instead consider 
providing a  reductive functionalist theory of the cognitive phenomenal proper-
ties which in their view determine intentional content. 
 To illustrate, consider a non-arithmetical example. In the passage quoted 
in §1, Horgan and Tienson say that there is a unique cognitive phenomenal 
property that metaphysically necessitates believing  that there is a picture hang-
ing on the wall behind one . Call it  P for “picture.” By contrast to the proponent 
of a biological theory of phenomenal properties, the reductive functionalist I 
have in mind will identify  P with some kind of functional property deﬁ ned in 
terms of external inputs and behavioral outputs. Here I understand functional 
properties broadly to include historically determined “tracking” relations to 
the environment. Let  functional CP-determination be the conjunction of the 
CP-determination thesis and some functionalist theory of cognitive phenom-
enal properties. 
 h us, suppose that  L is the functional property that David Lewis (1994) 
would say constitutes occurrently believing that there is a picture hanging 
on the wall behind one. h e proponent of functional CP-determination might 
say that the cognitive phenomenal property  P just is the Lewisian functional 
property  L . Or again, suppose that  F is the functional property that Jerry 
Fodor (1994) would say constitutes having the same occurrent belief. It might 
involve the tokening of a mentalese sentence, functional role, and relations of 
“asymmetric-dependence” to the external world. According to another version 
of functional CP-determination, the cognitive phenomenal property  P just is 
the environment-involving functional property  F . So, cognitive phenomenol-
ogy and hence cognitive intentionality is not in the head, just as some inten-
tionalists about experience insist that sensory phenomenology is not in the 
head (as noted in the introduction). According to any version of functional 
CP-determination, cognitive phenomenal properties constitute intentional 
properties, because they are identical with functional properties and those 
functional properties constitute intentional properties. 
 Now friends of CP-determination  could accept functional CP-determination, 
thereby providing a “naturalistic” theory of how cognitive phenomenal prop-
erties ground intentionality. True, rejecting biological CP-determination and 
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accepting functional CP-determination would require rejecting the thesis that 
cognitive phenomenal properties are  intrinsic; but I never built that into the 
formulation of CP-determination. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Pautz 2008: 
272–273), what is arguably the  core thesis of the phenomenal intentionality 
program—namely, that phenomenology is in some sense the source of all inten-
tionality—is quite compatible with reductive externalist (for example, track-
ing) theories of phenomenology. Recently, Kriegel (2011: 69, 249) has made 
the same point and has developed it into a whole theory. He says he is strongly 
attracted to a version of functional CP-determination. In particular, he favors a 
 higher-order tracking theory of phenomenal intentionality (109). However, while 
Kriegel favors functional CP-determination, I think other friends of phenom-
enal intentionality will reject it, given their other commitments. 
 (i) As noted in §1, Horgan and coauthors as well as Pitt hold that cogni-
tive phenomenal properties are intrinsic and “non-relational.” h is rules out 
functional CP-determination, since the relevant functional properties are 
non-intrinsic. 12 
 (ii) As noted (§2.1), Horgan and coauthors reject all  orthodox physicalist solu-
tions to the determinacy problems due to Quine and Kripkenstein. h ey appear 
to hold that the functional facts are insuﬃ  cient to constitute (or even “ﬁ x”) 
the intentional facts. But, according to functional CP-determination, the func-
tional facts  do constitute the intentional facts. For, according to functional 
CP-determination, the cognitive-phenomenal facts constitute the intentional 
facts; further, they are  identical with certain functional facts; so (by Leibniz’s 
law) the functional facts constitute the intentional facts. 
 (iii) Presumably, fans of the phenomenal intentionality program would say 
that their claim that phenomenology grounds intentionality plays an  essen-
tial role in avoiding the well-known problems of detail plaguing the reductive 
externalist program and the naturalization program more generally. But those 
who favor functional CP-determination (Kriegel 2011: 109) cannot say this. 
As just noted, like standard naturalists, they are committed to saying that cer-
tain naturalistic facts (about functional role, inferential role, tracking, and so 
on) constitute the intentional facts. So they face the standard  problems of detail 
with that claim. For instance, they are committed to the existence of a general, 
non-circular, counterexample-free naturalistic account of intentionality of the 
form  state S has content C iﬀ  S satisﬁ es naturalistic condition F , despite the “dismal 
history” of failed attempts to provide such an account. h ey face the disjunc-
tion problem, the depth (distance) problem, Kripke’s problem of ﬁ nitude, and 
Quine’s inscrutability problem. How do they have any advantage concerning 
these problems over standard naturalists such as Fodor and Lewis who do not 
recognize cognitive phenomenology? True, they believe that some of the rele-
vant content-grounding naturalistic properties are identical with non-sensory 
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phenomenal properties, while standard naturalists deny that they have any 
special “feel.” Perhaps it will be said that this gives them an advantage (thanks 
here to Uriah Kriegel). But how could this identity claim possibly help them 
solve these particular problems? What exactly are their solutions? h eir accep-
tance of this identity claim does not mean that they believe that there are  more 
facts out there in the world than those recognized by standard naturalists like 
Fodor and Lewis. Both sides agree that the only facts out there are the natu-
ralistic facts: facts about functional role, inferential role, tracking, biological 
function, and so on. So they have exactly the same basic materials to work with. 
h erefore, if there are solutions to the aforementioned metaphysical problems 
about content determination compatible with functional CP-determination, 
those very same solutions are also compatible ( mutatis mutandis ) with standard 
naturalism. 
 Since I can think of no plausible  reductive theory of cognitive phenomenol-
ogy consistent with the things proponents of CP-determination have said, I 
provisionally conclude that they must accept  primitivist CP-determination. 
Indeed, the passages from Horgan and Tienson and Strawson quoted in §1 
already suggest some kind of “primitivist” view of cognitive phenomenology 
and intentionality. 
 Primitivist CP-determination comes in two possible versions. According to 
a quite extreme version, there is  no real deﬁ nition of a cognitive phenomenal 
property. In other words, there is no (a priori or a posteriori) answer, in neural 
or functional or other terms, to the question:  what is it to have a given cog-
nitive phenomenal property? In this sense, cognitive phenomenal properties 
are utterly simple, just as G. E. Moore said goodness is utterly simple. Yet they 
somehow “ground” determinate belief and desire properties, in accordance 
with CP-determination. For instance, it is just a brute fact that, if you have a 
certain utterly simple, unstructured cognitive phenomenal property, you stand 
in the belief relation to a plus-content, as opposed to a bent, quus-like con-
tent. According to another version of primitivist CP-determination, there is 
a  partial answer to the question: what is it to have a particular cognitive phe-
nomenal property? h e idea is that having a particular cognitive phenomenal 
property simply  consists in (and so trivially determines) occurrently standing 
in a particular intentional relation to a particular narrow content. So cogni-
tive phenomenal properties have a relational structure. Of course this  iden-
tity view would nicely explain the tight relationship that is supposed to obtain 
between cognitive phenomenology and intentionality. It would explain why it 
is necessary that if you “change either the attitude-type (believing, desiring, 
wondering, hoping, etc.) or the particular [narrow] intentional content” then 
“the phenomenal character thereby changes too” (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 
522). 13 What makes the view I have in mind  primitivist is that it adds that there 
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is in turn no reductive account of our phenomenally constituted intentional 
 relations toward narrow contents. For instance, there is no answer to the ques-
tion: what  is it for you to occurrently  believe that two plus two equals four, as 
opposed to two quus two equals four? h is kind of “constitutive” question can-
not be answered by appealing to functional role or anything else. h is view of 
cognitive phenomenal properties is analogous to  non-reductive intentionalism 
about sensory phenomenal properties (Chalmers 2006; Pautz 2006, 2010a). 
 Now I can ﬁ nally state my “danglers” argument, which targets  primitiv-
ist CP-determination. Let  P be the phenomenal property which allegedly 
determines (perhaps just is) your occurrently believing that two plus two 
equals four, as opposed to two quus two equals four. According to primitivist 
CP-determination,  P is not a physical property, at least in a narrow sense where 
physical properties just include mainstream physical properties like neural 
properties, functional properties, tracking properties, and so on. Yet even on 
this view your having this primitive cognitive phenomenal property is not a 
ﬂ uke; it is in  some sense determined by one of your mainstream physical prop-
erties. h us Strawson (2010: note 54) speculates that cognitive phenomenal 
properties are dependent on neural properties instantiated somewhere near 
the sensory regions of the brain. Alternatively, perhaps your having  P is con-
nected to (but distinct from) your having a more complex functional property 
involving your inferential dispositions. In any case, there is a true conditional 
of the form: necessarily, if any individual has physical property  F , then that 
individual has  distinct primitive cognitive phenomenal property  P , which in 
turn determines (and perhaps just is) his occurrently believing the content  two 
plus two equals four as opposed to the content  two quus two equals four . h ese 
conditionals link the physical properties of individuals with their determi-
nately believing (or desiring or wondering) some narrow contents rather than 
others. 
 Now, according to any version of primitivist CP-determination, these condi-
tionals simply  admit of no explanation . On one version, they are merely  nomically 
necessary. h ey are fundamental laws of nature, dangling from the body of fun-
damental physical laws of nature. For instance, maybe there is a basic law link-
ing some neural state  M with a plus-phenomenology and a certain plus-content 
(for example,  two plus two equals four ), rather than a quus-phenomenology and a 
quus-content ( two quus two equals four ). h is amounts to dualism: there are pos-
sible zombie worlds, in which everyone is physically the same but no one has 
the relevant special phenomenal and intentional properties. On another pos-
sible version of primitivist CP-determination, the conditionals linking physical 
conditions with distinct intentional conditions are brute  metaphysical necessi-
ties . What I mean by calling them “brute” is not that they are not a priori. I 
mean that they cannot be derived from more basic modal truths (roughly along 
the lines of Dorr 2007). In that sense, they “dangle from” the rest of the body of 
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modal truths. In this version, primitivist CP-determination amounts to what 
I have called  primitivist physicalism (Pautz 2010a; see also Horgan 2010). Note 
that this view is exactly like dualism concerning  what there is . It only diﬀ ers 
from dualism only  modally , since like physicalism it entails that zombie worlds 
are metaphysically impossible. 
 Now we all must admit some brute nomic and metaphysical necessities: the 
fundamental laws of nature, the truths of logic, maybe certain non-logical 
metaphysical principles. However, we have general Occamist reasons to keep 
them to a minimum. h e trouble with primitivism about cognitive intention-
ality is that it solves the determinacy problems due to Quine and Kripkenstein 
at the cost of obnoxiously multiplying the stock of basic modal truths. h is 
is not a knockdown argument; but it gives us a strong reason to disbelieve 
the view. 14 
 My point here should be put as a dilemma. Either proponents of 
CP-determination say that cognitive phenomenal properties are identical with 
mainstream physical or functional properties, or else they accept primitivism. 
If they accept the ﬁ rst horn (Kriegel 2011: chap. 2 expresses sympathy), then 
they might avoid “danglers,” because then they would have a respectable reduc-
tive view. But then they are in eﬀ ect accepting one or another of the familiar 
attempts to “naturalize” intentionality (Fodor, Dretske, Lewis, etc.). h ey are 
only adding that the physical-functional properties that determine content 
have a non-sensory “feel.” h is does not help them solve the standard problems 
of detail due to Kripkenstein and Quine and others. 15 If, on the other hand, 
they take the second “primitivist” horn, then their solution to these problems 
is not novel: it is just the primitivist solution, which has been on the table from 
the start (Quine 1960: 221). h ey are just adding that the primitive inten-
tional properties have a non-sensory feel. Moreover, they face the “danglers” 
argument. 
 3.2.  
 e Separation Argument 
 My remaining arguments against CP-determination—the “separation argu-
ment” and two more arguments to follow—have a common form. 
 To begin with, let me introduce the notion of  sensory-functional conditions . 
h ese are conditions concerning your actual or possible  sensory experiences. 
h ey include your actual perceptual and bodily experiences, sensory images, 
your experiences of inner speech, and transitions among sentences in inner 
speech. h ey include your experiences of  behaving in the world. h ey also 
include causal and dispositional conditions about your sensory experiences. 
h us, supposing you believe that there is food in the fridge, they include your 
 disposition to  form an image of food in the fridge, your disposition to  look in the 
cupboard should you  not see food in the fridge, and so on. 
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 Now built into CP-determination is a certain irreducibility thesis. h is is 
the thesis that cognitive phenomenal properties, and hence some belief and 
desire properties, are  distinct from all sensory properties, forming an autono-
mous level of mental reality. Indeed, following standard practice, I have  stipu-
lated that “cognitive phenomenal properties,” if such there be, are distinct from 
sensory properties. Now  irreducibility typically goes with modal independence . So 
the CP-determination thesis entails that  cognitive phenomenal properties, and 
hence some belief and desire properties, are totally modally independent of all sensory 
properties (Chalmers 2008). So they ought to be totally modally independent of 
 sensory-functional conditions , for those are just conditions involving patterns 
in the instantiation of sensory properties. All cognitive phenomenal proper-
ties, and hence some belief and desire properties, ought to be combinable with 
 any set of sensory-functional conditions. Consider an analogy: since auditory 
qualia are distinct from visual qualia, they can be combined with any series of 
visual qualia. 
 What my next three arguments have in common is that they are supposed to 
show that it is  not true that cognitive phenomenal properties, and hence some belief 
and desire properties, are completely modally independent of sensory-functional 
conditions. I will ask whether we can make sense of three types of scenarios in 
which cognitive phenomenal properties  ﬂ oat free from sensory-functional condi-
tions. I will argue that we cannot make sense of these scenarios. 
 My ﬁ rst argument, the  separation argument , generalizes my “separa-
tion argument” against biological CP-determination (§3.1) to any version of 
CP-determination. Consider an example. According to the CP-determination 
thesis defended by Horgan and Tienson, there is a cognitive phenomenal prop-
erty  P that metaphysically necessitates occurrently believing the narrow,  de 
se content  there is a picture on the wall behind one . Now, in the actual case,  P is 
associated with certain sensory-functional conditions: for instance, having the 
sentence “there is a picture on the wall behind me” run through one’s interior 
monologue, and imagining (or being disposed to imagine) a picture on the wall 
behind one. 
 h e ﬁ rst step of my separation argument asserts that,  if there is such a prop-
erty as  P distinct from all sensory properties, then there should be possible 
“separation cases” in which it is associated with a completely diﬀ erent set of 
sensory-functional conditions than those with which it is actually associated. 
In one such case, while Charlie has  P , the sentence “there is a  clock on the wall” 
runs through his interior monologue (where Charlie manifests understanding 
this sentence just as we do), he is disposed to form a sensory image of a  clock on 
a wall, and in general has sensory experiences of behaving exactly as if there is 
a  clock on the wall behind him (for example, if he were to experience someone 
asking for the time, he would experience himself turning around and looking 
at the wall). 
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 h e second step of my separation argument asserts that, in this case, even 
though by stipulation Charlie has  P , he does  not occurrently believe that 
there is a  picture on the wall behind him, contrary to Horgan and Tienson’s 
CP-determination thesis. h e  clock -appropriate sensory-functional conditions 
present in the case are incompatible with his having this occurrent belief. 16 
In general, for any belief and desire, some sensory-functional conditions are a 
priori incompatible with having that belief or desire. 17 In this sense, there are 
 sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire. 18 
 Consider a second separation case. Let  P be the cognitive phenomenal 
property which, according to proponents of CP-determination like Strawson, 
metaphysically necessitates occurrently believing the narrow content  two 
plus two equals four , thus solving the Kripkenstein problem. Again, my separa-
tion argument against CP-determination has two steps. First, if there is such 
a non-sensory property as  P , then a baby (say) presumably might have  P for 
a few seconds while otherwise remaining the same. h is might involve tem-
porarily modifying its neural state in the “cognitive phenomenology center” 
of its brain (Strawson 2010: note 54) while leaving everything else the same; 
but I see no reason that it should not be metaphysically possible. Second, even 
though the baby has cognitive phenomenal property  P , it does  not occurrently 
think that two plus two equals four, contrary to CP-determination. h at would 
require that it have certain arithmetical concepts (for example,  plus ), which 
in turn would require that it have certain arithmetical  abilities (for example, 
the ability to count). But by stipulation it lacks these abilities. In general, the 
sensory-functional conditions present (or rather absent) in the case are incom-
patible with the baby’s having the belief that two plus two equals four. 19 
 Here is a ﬁ nal separation case. First consider an actual person, Elmer. As 
we saw in §1, according to Horgan and Tienson, when an ordinary person 
like Elmer says “h ere’s a  rabbit ” and then “h ere’s an  undetached rabbit-part ,” 
he enjoys diﬀ erent cognitive phenomenal properties, and this somehow 
solves Quine’s (1960) inscrutability problem. Call them  R and  U , respec-
tively. Now consider an  altered cognitive qualia case where these cognitive 
phenomenal properties are everywhere  swapped with one another, but the 
 sensory-functional facts remain exactly the same. I cannot imagine this and 
so am skeptical of the very existence of these properties; but if Horgan and 
Tienson are right that there are such cognitive phenomenal properties dis-
tinct from sensory properties, the case should be possible. Further, given their 
commitment to CP-determination, they must say that, in this counterfactual 
case, when Elmer says “there’s a rabbit,” he is really thinking  there is an unde-
tached rabbit-part , because he has cognitive phenomenal property  U instead 
of  R . h ere are radical intentional diﬀ erences between the actual case and 
this case,  even though they are completely identical in all sensory and functional 
respects . h is is absurd: by stipulation, in this case as in the actual case, Elmer 
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visually focuses on the  whole rabbit, he insists “I am thinking about the rabbit, 
not just a rabbit-part,” and the use-properties of his sentences are exactly as 
they are in the actual case. 20 
 Now Siewert (1998: 285) at least addresses a case similar to one of my cases, 
the baby case. He simply asserts that the case is impossible, saying that he 
accepts “holism” about cognitive phenomenal properties and rejects “atomism.” 
He does not address cases like my Charlie case or my Elmer case in which cogni-
tive phenomenal properties are associated with diﬀ erent sensory-functional 
conditions than those with which they are in fact associated. But he might just 
declare that they too are impossible. In general, proponents of CP-determination 
(Graham, Horgan, and Tienson, Pitt, Strawson) might say that, since there are 
necessary sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire, and since cogni-
tive phenomenal properties determine belief and desire, there are necessary 
sensory-functional constraints on cognitive phenomenal properties. 
 But this is not enough. Remember: I gave an  argument for claiming that, if 
there are cognitive phenomenal properties, then separation cases are possible. 
Graham, Horgan, and Tienson as well as Pitt themselves say that cognitive phe-
nomenal properties are  distinct from all sensory properties. Given this, they 
should be  totally modally independent of sensory properties. Hence they should 
be modally independent of sensory-functional conditions, since these simply 
concern the pattern of instantiation of sensory properties. If proponents of 
CP-determination say that my separation cases are not possible, they need to 
answer this argument. When something is impossible, we generally expect an 
explanation for  why it is impossible. 
 Here is one response. According to David Lewis’s theory of  belief , occur-
rently believing that two plus two equals four is a complex functional prop-
erty  L involving relations to experiences, other beliefs, and behavior. h is view 
explains why belief properties are holistic and not atomistic, so that a baby (for 
instance) cannot have arithmetical beliefs. It explains why there are necessary 
sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire. To explain why separation 
cases are not possible, the proponent of CP-determination might apply the 
same model to  cognitive phenomenal properties . h us he might simply identify 
the cognitive phenomenal property  P (which allegedly determines believing  two 
plus two equals four ) with the Lewisian functional property  L . In general, cogni-
tive phenomenal properties reduce to functional properties, he might say. h is 
would  explain why cognitive phenomenal properties are holistic and not atom-
istic (why there are necessary sensory-functional constraints on having such 
properties), something Siewert asserts without explaining. It would explain 
why my separation cases are not possible for cognitive phenomenal properties, 
thus answering my separation argument against CP-determination. 
 But now CP-determination has become  functional CP-determination. It 
is now just functionalism about intentionality. As we saw in §3.1, this is not 
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compatible with the usual commitments of friends of the phenomenal inten-
tionality program. Indeed, they seem to hold that cognitive phenomenal prop-
erties are primitive properties that cannot be reduced to mainstream physical 
properties of any kind. 
 Let me suggest a diﬀ erent reply to my separation argument on behalf of 
proponents of CP-determination. I will introduce the reply by analogy. Swoyer 
(1982) accepts an interesting view about fundamental physical properties, 
like masses and charges. According to this view, they do not  reduce to clusters 
of dispositions or functional properties. But they essentially possess certain 
(second-order) nomic properties and essentially stand in certain nomic rela-
tions; these are given by the fundamental physical laws. So they are  necessarily 
connected with certain dispositional and functional properties, and “separation 
cases” in which they are recombined in ways that violate their nomic proﬁ les 
are metaphysically impossible. h ere are unHumean metaphysically necessary 
connections between distinct existences. 
 Likewise, proponents of CP-determination might say that cognitive phe-
nomenal properties are  distinct from sensory phenomenal properties. But they 
are necessarily connected with certain sensory-functional conditions. h ey 
essentially bear certain systematic relations to various other states and condi-
tions: other cognitive phenomenal properties, behavior or attempts at behav-
ior, mental dispositions and abilities (for example, inferential dispositions and 
dispositions to form certain images), sensory experiences, and so on. Hence, 
any given cognitive phenomenal property (realizing a particular belief or 
desire property) necessarily brings with it a  system of states and abilities. h is 
is not because cognitive phenomenal properties  reduce to abstract functional 
properties or clusters of dispositions, as in functional CP-determination. 
Rather, it is just a brute modal fact, brute in the sense that it cannot be derived 
from real deﬁ nitions and logic (Dorr 2007). Hence, under this view, the 
sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire are just brute modal facts. 
Call this version of CP-determination  systemic CP-determination . Under  sys-
temic CP-determination , my separation cases involving cognitive phenomenal 
properties (Charlie, the baby, Elmer) are impossible. So my separation argu-
ment against CP-determination fails at the ﬁ rst step. 
 But, since we have  no reason to accept CP-determination in general (§2), 
we have no reason to accept systemic CP-determination. On the other hand, 
we have strong reasons to reject it. (i) Previously, we saw that proponents of 
CP-determination apparently must accept primitivist CP-determination, 
which requires brute modal principles connecting cognitive phenomenal 
properties with underlying physical states. Now we have seen that, to accom-
modate the sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire and avoid my 
separation argument, they must accept additional brute “systemic” principles 
connecting cognitive phenomenal properties with other mental conditions 
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and background abilities. But we ought to keep brute modal principles to a 
minimum. 21 (ii) Presumably, a fundamental physical property might have a 
determinate functional proﬁ le, given by the fundamental laws of nature. But 
what are the essential functional proﬁ les of cognitive phenomenal properties? 
For instance, does the cognitive phenomenal property  P discussed previously 
necessitate the disposition to form a visual image of a picture (rather than a 
clock) on the wall behind one (at least in those with the capacity for visual 
imagination)? Presumably, there will be a lot of vagueness here. So systemic 
CP-determinate requires objectionable “vagueness in the world” concerning 
the fundamental modal facts. 22 
 3.3.  Absent Cognitive Qualia Cases 
 Before (§2) I used  absent qualia cases to undermine the determinacy and access 
arguments for CP-determination. Now I will use such cases in arguments 
against cognitive phenomenology. 
 My ﬁ rst argument casts doubt on the basic CP- existence thesis and has two 
steps. h e ﬁ rst step asserts that, if there are cognitive phenomenal properties, 
then cases of the following kind are possible and indeed we should be able to 
 positively imagine them: (i) you have  exactly the same sensory properties and 
functional properties that you have in the actual case,  and yet (ii) your phenom-
enal life is profoundly diﬀ erent from your actual phenomenal life in that you 
lack the phenomenal properties (namely, cognitive phenomenal properties) you 
actually enjoy. Indeed, presumably, if the CP-existence thesis is true, and cog-
nitive phenomenal properties form a distinct  experiential modality (Strawson 
2010: note 54), then there might be among  actual humans individuals who lack 
cognitive qualia, but otherwise have phenomenal lives very similar to normal 
individuals. Analogy: our auditory phenomenal properties are distinct from 
our visual phenomenal properties. So there are possible (indeed actual) indi-
viduals who see but do not hear. 
 h e second step of the argument is that we cannot positively imagine such 
cases. Just try. Suppose in the actual case you hear a friend say “Let’s go to the 
bar later” and you quickly form an image of the local bar and follow up with a 
question as to time. Now try to imagine a case that is completely identical to 
the actual case in all sensory and functional respects, and yet profoundly phe-
nomenally diﬀ erent in many ways in that you lack the cognitive phenomenal 
properties that you allegedly actually possess. I honestly cannot do it. 
 In short, the CP-existence thesis makes  testable empirical predictions about 
what we can imagine. But the predictions are false. 
 Perhaps the proponent of the CP-existence thesis will reply: just imagine 
hearing “Let’s go to the bar” while not being a speaker of English. But that case 
would diﬀ er in  sensory and  functional respects from the actual case. If I did not 
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understand English my auditory system would not parse the auditory stream 
“Let’s go to the bar” in the same way it actually does. So I would have a diﬀ er-
ent auditory experience. I would also not form a quick image of the local bar. 
Not understanding what was said, I might also feel stressed. And I would not 
be disposed to follow up with certain questions. What the proponent of the 
CP-existence thesis is committed to is the possibility of a case in which  all the 
past and present sensory and functional facts are held  constant (the very  same 
auditory experiences, the same imagery, the very same feelings, and so on), and 
yet my phenomenal life is  profoundly diﬀ erent from my actual phenomenal life 
 in myriad ways . It is this I cannot imagine. 
 Galen Strawson suggested another reply to me (in discussion): that in the 
hypothetical case I would just be  very bored . But, since in this case I would be a 
sensory-functional duplicate of my actual self, I do not think I would be bored. 
More importantly,  if we actually have cognitive phenomenal properties, then 
the absent cognitive qualia case would diﬀ er from the actual case in  many 
ways: each and every cognitive phenomenal property I allegedly actually pos-
sess would in this case be “subtracted out.” To simply say that I would be  bored 
simply does not enable me to imagine the  myriad ways in which this case would 
diﬀ er from the actual case. 
 Maybe the defender of cognitive phenomenology could insist that this case 
is possible, even if I cannot imagine it. But why should this be? It is not only 
possible that my experiential life should diﬀ er in myriad ways because I lack all 
of my actual auditory phenomenal properties while the rest of my phenomenal 
life is held constant; I can easily imagine this case. So why cannot I easily imag-
ine occupying a phenomenal world diﬀ erent in myriad ways because all of my 
actual cognitive phenomenal properties are removed, while  all of the sensory 
and functional aspects of my life stay exactly the same? 23 
 Now I turn to my second argument involving absent cognitive qualia cases. 
While my ﬁ rst argument was directed against proponents of the CP-existence 
thesis, my second argument is directed against what we might call the  neces-
sity thesis: non-sensory cognitive and conative qualia are  necessary in order to 
have the level of content determinacy we actually enjoy. We have seen that 
Horgan and Tienson rely on this thesis in their determinacy argument for 
CP-determination (it corresponds to premise 3 of that argument). Strawson 
(in the quote in §1) also says that cognitive qualia are necessary to solving the 
Kripkenstein problem. 
 Let’s focus on an example. Suppose that in the  actual case while hunting 
Elmer has a visual experience of a rabbit and has the sensory phenomenology 
of attending to the  whole rabbit, as opposed to a rabbit part. He says, “Lo, a 
rabbit.” He also has hunger pangs and imagines having rabbit for dinner. He is 
disposed to behave exactly as if he believes that a rabbit is present and desires 
to have it for dinner. 
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 Next consider an  absent cognitive qualia case in which the entire human 
population is identical to the actual population in all  sensory and  functional 
respects, but no one possesses any non-sensory cognitive and conative phe-
nomenal properties. 24 So in this case Elmer is just as I have described him to be 
in the actual case, only he lacks any cognitive and conative qualia. 
 Now, arguably, in the absent cognitive qualia case as well as in the actual 
case, Elmer has  some kind of rabbit beliefs and desires (see §2.2 for arguments 
that individuals in absent cognitive qualia cases are not “cognitive zombies”). 
h e proponent of the necessity thesis need not say otherwise. What he must say 
is only that in the absent cognitive qualia case Elmer’s rabbit beliefs and desires 
are much more  indeterminate in content than they are in the actual case. In par-
ticular, given what they say in the passage quoted in §1, Graham, Horgan, and 
Tienson are committed to saying that in the actual case Elmer determinately 
believes that a  rabbit is present and desires to have a  rabbit for dinner, whereas 
in the absent cognitive qualia case it is indeterminate whether Elmer’s belief 
and desire are about rabbits as opposed to undetached rabbit parts. So there is 
a diﬀ erence in intentional facts across the cases. 
 h is case shows that the necessity thesis violates  sensory-functional superve-
nience: the thesis that the total intentional facts about a population supervene on 
the total sensory and (wide and narrow) functional facts about that population. 
 My argument against the necessity thesis is now this. In the absent cogni-
tive qualia case as in the actual case, Elmer enjoys the sensory phenomenology 
of focusing on the  whole rabbit (not just a part), he is disposed to respond to 
Quinean indeterminacy arguments by insisting that he has beliefs and desires 
about “rabbits” rather than “undetached rabbit parts,” the use-properties of his 
sentences are exactly the same, and so on. All the ﬁ rst-person and third-person 
evidence suggests that across these cases his belief and desire enjoy the same 
level of determinacy, contrary to the necessity thesis. 
 Likewise, in an absent cognitive qualia case identical to the actual case in all 
functional and sensory respects (including experiences of counting objects and 
so on), all the ﬁ rst-person and third-person evidence suggest that our  arith-
metical beliefs have the same level of content determinacy that they have in the 
actual case. h erefore, contrary to Strawson, cognitive qualia are not necessary 
to answering the Kripkenstein problem. 
 h is supports sensory-functional supervenience: the total intentional facts 
about a population supervene on the total sensory and (wide and narrow) func-
tional facts about that population, without any need for cognitive qualia. 
 3.4.  Disembodied Cognitive Qualia Cases 
 Finally, I have two related arguments against cognitive phenomenology involv-
ing what I shall call “disembodied cognitive qualia cases.” 
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 My ﬁ rst argument casts doubt on the CP- existence thesis and has two steps. If 
there are cognitive qualia, then in the actual world they are  embodied in the sense 
that they are accompanied by sensory properties, including experiences of having 
a body and acting on the world. h e ﬁ rst step of my argument asserts that, if there 
are cognitive phenomenal properties distinct from all sensory properties, then 
 disembodied cognitive qualia cases ought to be possible and indeed we should be able 
to positively  imagine them. In such a case, we allegedly have a rich phenomenal life 
that  overlaps with our actual phenomenal life because we have all the same cogni-
tive phenomenal properties we have in the actual world; but our cognitive phe-
nomenal properties are “disembodied” in the sense that they are not accompanied 
by any  sensory properties. In other words, we have no visual experiences (includ-
ing no experiences of having a body or engaging in apparent behaviors), auditory 
experiences, no mental imagery, no “inner speech,” and so on. Consider an anal-
ogy: auditory qualia are distinct from other kinds of qualia. So we can imagine 
cases in which such qualia occur in the absence of all other sorts of qualia. 25 
 h e second step of my disembodied cognitive qualia argument against the 
CP-existence thesis is that we  cannot positively imagine such a case. At least  I 
cannot. Just try. If the CP-existence thesis is true, then in such a case we have 
a rich phenomenal life that  overlaps with our actual phenomenal life, only it is 
totally non-sensory. But what would it be like? Can you imagine this overlapping 
phenomenology? If you try to imagine what it would be like, you might imagine 
seeing all black, having an experience of inner speech (“nothing much is hap-
pening”), and so on. But then you will not be imagining a case in which you have 
cognitive phenomenal properties but  no sensory properties. So the CP-existence 
thesis makes a  false empirical predication about what we can imagine. 
 In reply, the proponent of the CP-existence thesis might say that such cases 
are possible, but that for some reason we cannot positively imagine them. But 
why not? When it comes to other sorts of qualia, we can easily imagine cases in 
which they occur in the absence of distinct kinds of qualia: for instance, we can 
imagine having only auditory qualia. 
 Now I turn to my second argument involving disembodied cognitive qua-
lia cases. While my ﬁ rst argument was directed against the CP-existence the-
sis, my second argument is directed against the CP-determination thesis. Let 
Nemo be someone who enjoys a rich series of cognitive phenomenal properties 
of the kind we actually undergo but who has no sensory phenomenal proper-
ties at all. (For the sake of argument, let us just grant that the case is possible, 
contrary to my ﬁ rst argument.) Now, according to CP-determination, Nemo’s 
having such a rich series of cognitive phenomenal properties alone determines 
(perhaps just consists in) his having a series of our actual sophisticated nar-
row beliefs and desires: for instance, the belief that two plus two equals four 
(Strawson), the belief that a picture is hanging on the wall behind him (Horgan 
and Tienson), and so on. Hence, according to CP-determination, Nemo has a 
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rich series of occurrent narrow beliefs and desires, even though he has never 
had any sensory experiences whatever. 
 But this can be ruled out a priori. Even if Siewert (1998: 277) is right that 
there are occasional cases of simple, purely non-sensory conscious thoughts in 
us (I would deny even that), the extreme case of Nemo is impossible. Like the 
baby discussed earlier, Nemo does not satisfy the a priori sensory-functional 
constraints on belief and desire. He has never had any visual or other experi-
ences of walls or pictures or spatial properties (like  being behind ), or sets of two 
or four objects. He does not use a language like English, or even have experiences 
of using a language like English. He does not have any dispositions to engage in 
physical behavior. In fact, he does not have any  experiences of behaving in the 
world (for example, counting or adding). He does not even have any experiences 
 remotely like these experiences, even if he has “cognitive experiences.” Intuitively, 
all this means that we cannot credit him with the belief that  two plus  two equals 
 four , the belief that a  picture is hanging on the  wall that is  behind him, and so 
on. Hence, even if the CP-existence thesis is true, consideration of disembodied 
cognitive qualia cases show that the CP-determination thesis is false. 
 h e proponent of CP-determination can avoid this argument only by accept-
ing what I called systemic CP-determination. h e idea would be that, even though 
cognitive phenomenal properties are  distinct from all sensory phenomenal prop-
erties, they are somehow necessarily connected with sensory phenomenal prop-
erties, so that entirely “disembodied cognitive qualia” cases are impossible. But, 
as I said, there is no reason to accept this view and it requires brute modal con-
nections. It is a bit like saying that, even though auditory qualia are distinct 
from visual qualia, they are necessarily connected with visual qualia. 
 In sum, the CP-determination thesis holds that cognitive phenomenal 
properties, and hence some belief and desire properties, are entirely distinct 
from sensory properties. h ey form a distinct level of mental reality. But then 
they ought to be totally modally independent from sensory-functional condi-
tions. But consideration of separation cases, altered cognitive qualia, absent 
cognitive qualia, and disembodied cognitive qualia suggest that this is not so. 
Indeed, these cases support sensory-functional supervenience: the total inten-
tional facts about a population supervene on the total sensory and (wide and 
narrow) functional facts about that population, without any need for cognitive 
phenomenology. I will now sketch a view of this kind. 
 4.  An Alternative: Phenomenal Functionalism 
 h e CP-determination thesis does not represent the only way of developing 
the plausible, broadly empiricist thought that phenomenology grounds mental 
content. 
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 I will now sketch a modiﬁ ed version of David Lewis’s inﬂ uential function-
alist theory of intentionality, which I call  phenomenal functionalism . It entails 
that  sensory phenomenology grounds all determinate intentionality. I will not 
attempt to argue for Lewis’s holistic, functionalist approach; Lewis and others 
have done so and the virtues of a holistic approach to belief and desire should be 
clear from the preceding discussion. Instead, after brieﬂ y stating Lewis’s own 
functionalism, I will raise an overlooked problem for it involving the notion 
of  sensory evidence . h en I will explain phenomenal functionalism and how it 
solves the problem. Finally, I will explain how it accommodates the main ideas 
of the phenomenal intentionality program while avoiding the problems I have 
raised for CP-determination. 
 Roughly, according to Lewis’s own a priori functionalism (1974: 120), an 
individual has an (occurrent or standing) intentional state (for example, belief 
or desire) with content  p iﬀ  it is part of the best interpretation (or all of the inter-
pretations tied for best) that the individual has that intentional state. Lewis 
holds that the  best interpretation is an objective notion: it is the assignment of 
intentional states that best satisﬁ es a handful of general principles, given the 
functional facts about the individual and others of his kind. h e principles are 
a priori truths about intentional states drawn from folk psychology. 26 
 One principle is the  behavior-rationalization principle: all else being equal, 
an individual tends to have beliefs and desires that make his behavior largely 
rational. But this cannot alone determine a reasonable best interpretation. 
Suppose Karl is in front of a round thing and reaches for it. One interpretation 
is that he wants a round thing, believes that a round thing is before him, and so 
believes that by reaching he will get it. Another, deviant interpretation is that 
he has a basic desire for a saucer of mud, believes that one is before him, and so 
believes that by reaching he will get it. 
 Lewis therefore invokes a second principle, the  humanity (or “charity”) prin-
ciple . It has two parts. First, some basic beliefs and desires are objectively rea-
sonable  simpliciter , and people tend to have these. Second, some beliefs (and 
perhaps even some desires) are objectively reasonable,  given one’s history of sen-
sory experiences and evidence ; and people tend to have these. h is does not mean 
that a subject’s beliefs or experiences must be largely accurate: the beliefs of a 
brain in a vat are reasonable but false. 27 Now return to Karl. Given that Karl 
is having an experience as of a round thing, the belief that there is a round 
thing before him is more reasonable than the belief that a saucer of mud is 
before him. And a basic desire for a saucer of mud would be unreasonable. So 
the humanity constraint will favor the ﬁ rst interpretation mentioned over the 
second, deviant interpretation. 
 Indeed, Lewis relies on the humanity principle to rule out  all deviant inter-
pretations of belief and desire compatible with the behavior-rationalization 
principle. For instance, given the humanity principle, Lewis could easily rule 
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out Williams’s (2007) recent deviant global arithmetical reinterpretation of 
all thought and language (even perceptual reports like “that is square”), by 
noting that arithmetical beliefs are typically evidentially unrelated our per-
ceptual experiences and other available evidence. 28 Using the humanity prin-
ciple, Lewis can also rule out Kripke’s more local deviant interpretation of 
our arithmetical thought, involving the “quus” function. For Lewis explicitly 
says that his preeminent humanity principle concerning reasonable belief 
 entails as a special case his much-discussed “naturalness principle,” which 
favors natural contents over unnatural ones. 29 For instance, given our his-
tory of evidence, it is more reasonable to believe that all emeralds are  blue 
than it is to believe that all emeralds are  grue . In the same way, the humanity 
principle favors the assignment of more natural plus-contents over unnatu-
ral quus-contents. h us the Kripkenstein puzzle is solved without “cognitive 
phenomenology.” 30 
 Now for the serious overlooked problem for Lewis’s view, which I will call 
the  problem of evidence . Given Karl’s rich history of evidence, the humanity 
principle helps to rule out deviant interpretations. But what determines his 
evidence? At one point Lewis (1974: 112) speaks of “Karl’s life history of evi-
dence according to [the physical facts about him],” suggesting that his evidence 
is simply part of the basic physical facts about Karl described in non-mental, 
non-intentional terms. But this is not true. Although there are diﬀ erent con-
ceptions of evidence, Karl’s evidence clearly necessarily depends  somehow on 
his history of  experiences and their phenomenal characters. Further, there is 
strong reason to accept  intentionalism about experience, according to which 
their phenomenal characters are determined by their very detailed  intentional 
contents (Chalmers 2004; Pautz 2010c; Tye 2000). h us the problem of evidence 
becomes an extremely diﬃ  cult special case of the problem of intentionality. 
We might call it the  problem of sensory intentionality . h is is one element of 
the  hard problem of consciousness . Now, since Lewis is  physicalist and a  global 
functionalist who applies his functionalism to all intentional states, in order 
to solve this problem he needs additional constitutive principles that go from 
the purely physical facts about Karl to the rich contents of his  experiences . His 
behavior-rationalization principle and his humanity principle evidently only 
apply to beliefs and desires. 
 Lewis never explicitly addresses the problem of evidence, that is, the problem 
of sensory intentionality. However, he does say something that suggests what 
his solution might be: “A state typically caused by round things before the eyes 
is a good candidate for interpretation as the visual experience of confronting 
something round” (1983, 374). Lewis also holds that an experience as of a red 
thing is a state that is caused by the color in fact possessed by pillar-boxes and 
other standard red things. h is suggests a  simple causal principle : very roughly, 
if, in the relevant population, state  S would be caused by something’s being  F , 
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in so-and-so range of actual and counterfactual cases, then  S is an experience 
with the content  that something is F is present . 
 h e idea is that suitable causal connections to the world pin down the rich 
contents of Karl’s experiences and hence (given intentionalism) what his expe-
riences are like and what evidence is available to him. In turn, by the humanity 
constraint, Karl’s experiential evidence plays a crucial role in pinning down the 
contents of his beliefs and desires and ultimately language, by ruling out “devi-
ant interpretations.” h us, causal connections to the world  very indirectly help 
ﬁ x the contents of his beliefs and desires. 31 
 It is worth mentioning that Lewis’s appeal to the actual and potential causes 
of a state is quite compatible with his well-known belief in  narrow content and 
his intuitive motivation for it ( pace Stalnaker 2004: 211). Lewis explicitly says 
that, according to his conception of narrow content, it is not wholly intrinsic. 
For Lewis, narrow content is just content that is intuitively shared by individu-
als (for example, you and your Twin Earth duplicate)  whose states are typically 
caused by the same external states and typically cause the same behavior across a 
range of actual and possible cases (1994: 425). Even if causal relations to the world 
determine content, it can be narrow in his very weak sense (Braddon-Mitchell 
and Jackson 2007: 240). 
 However my view is that the causal solution to the problem of sensory inten-
tionality fails, for two reasons.  First , the simple causal principle is too simple. 
h e problems are the usual ones for reductive psychosemantic theories: the dis-
junction problem, the depth (distance) problem, and other problems of detail. 
Further, as stated, the simple causal principle entails that all states that track 
the environment are experiences. h is is wrong: Karl has perceptual beliefs 
and various sub-personal states that track the environment, but they are not 
experiences. h ese problems are especially serious for the a priori function-
alist. You might think that, to solve these problems, he could just propose a 
much more sophisticated causal principle, appealing to things like asymmet-
ric dependence, biologically normal conditions, and cognitive accessibility. h e 
trouble is that such a principle would be far too  recherch é to be something that 
the folk implicitly know a priori. In fact, no such principle could be a priori for 
the simple reason that we evidently cannot a priori deduce what experiences 
Karl has merely from the causal and functional facts about him. 
 My  second problem for causal theories of sensory intentionality goes deeper. 
According to any causal theory, the content of experience, and hence (given 
intentionalism) the phenomenology of experience, can only be  narrow in Lewis’s 
very weak sense: it is shared by duplicates whose states would be typically caused, 
in the relevant populations, by the same external conditions. But I agree with 
friends of the phenomenal intentionality program that we should accept some 
stronger version of phenomenal internalism. h e only diﬀ erence is that, while 
their arguments are based on dubious intuitions about brains-in-vats (Horgan, 
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Tienson, and Graham 2004), mine are ﬁ rmly rooted in psychophysics and neu-
roscience. Since the phenomenal character of experience, and hence the content 
of experience, is internally determined in a strong sense, all causal theories of 
sensory content like Lewis’s are non-starters, even setting aside problems of 
detail. Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that  none of our standard models for 
reducing intentionality apply to sensory intentionality (see notes 5 and 11). 
 But while Lewis’s ambitious reductive functionalism may fail because 
it does not apply to the hard case of sensory intentionality, a less ambitious 
non-reductive version I call  phenomenal functionalism may have some promise. 
 Phenomenal functionalism gives up on the task of providing a functionalist or 
other reductive account of  sensory experience and its intentionality. Here it takes 
an anti-reductive view, according to which experiences are irreducible inten-
tional states. h e anti-reductionist approach could take any of a variety of forms 
(Alston 1999; Johnston 2007; Levine forthcoming). My own view,  non-reductive 
intentionalism goes as follows (Pautz 2006, 2010a; Chalmers 2006). All experi-
ence (with the possible exception of undirected moods) is essentially intentional. 
For instance, Karl’s having an experience with the distinctive phenomenology 
of seeing a tomato is just a matter of standing in a special “experiential” inten-
tional relation to a detailed intentional content involving simple perceptible 
properties like colors and shapes. I call this relation the “conscious-of relation.” 
(I do not mean we are literally conscious of contents, which are abstract objects.) 
What makes the view non-reductive is that it also holds that this relation is irre-
ducible. Although what contents we are conscious of in some sense supervene 
on physical conditions (on my internalist view, internal physical conditions), 
the conscious-of relation is not identiﬁ able with a relation characterizable in 
non-phenomenal, physical terms (for example, a causal or tracking relation). 
 Phenomenal functionalism combines anti-reductionism about Karl’s sen-
sory experiences with a functionalist theory of all of Karl’s intentional states 
 other than his sensory experiences, for instance his occurrent and standing 
beliefs and desires. In particular, Karl has the belief or desire that  p iﬀ  it is part 
of “best interpretation” that the agent believes or desires that  p . Here the  best 
interpretation is the one that best satisﬁ es the a priori principles about beliefs 
and desires, given two sorts of facts about Karl: (i)  his history of experiences , 
which according to non-reductive intentionalism are themselves fundamental 
intentional states; and (ii) the wide and narrow functional facts about Karl and 
others of his kind. h e wide functional facts help determine the “wide” con-
tents of his beliefs and desires. h us, while Lewis’s functionalism is global, phe-
nomenal functionalism is local, applying only to  non-sensory intentional states . 
Since it takes sensory experiences to be irreducible intentional states, it agrees 
with Quine (1960: 221) that determinate intentionality is not reducible all the 
way down to third-person, physical facts. 
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 On phenomenal functionalism, when it comes to the problem of intention-
ality, we start with a giant leg up, because Karl’s experiences, with their deter-
minate world-directed intentionality, are among the fundamental facts about 
Karl. Karl’s experiences of the world, which determine his history of evidence, 
are anchor points that help to determine,  via the humanity constraint, the 
contents of his downstream beliefs and desires and ultimately language, by 
ruling out deviant interpretations. h us the present local functionalist the-
ory solves the problem of evidence that plagues Lewis’s global functionalist 
theory. 32 
 Phenomenal functionalism should be attractive to friends of the phenom-
enal intentionality program for several reasons. 
 (i) Phenomenal functionalism avoids the three main problems I raised for 
CP-determination. First, it does not require extra laws or “danglers” connect-
ing the physical facts about an agent like Karl with his “cognitive qualia” and 
thereby his beliefs and desires. h e picture is that the physical facts about 
Karl a posteriori determine his irreducible sensory-intentional states. h en, 
his irreducible sensory-intentional states, together with the functional facts 
about him, are enough to a priori determine his beliefs and desires, given gen-
eral constitutive principles about belief and desire that we must all accept. 
Second, phenomenal functionalism accommodates and explains the neces-
sary sensory - functional constraints on belief and desire: they follow from the 
real deﬁ nition of the belief relation and desire relation in terms of the “best 
interpretation,” given the functional and sensory facts about an agent. h ird, it 
accommodates the plausible thesis of  sensory-functional supervenience: the total 
intentional facts about a population supervene on the total sensory and func-
tional facts about that population. 
 (ii) Phenomenal functionalism is also compatible with the claim of pro-
ponents of the phenomenal intentionality program that much intentional-
ity supervenes on phenomenology alone. To illustrate, now suppose that Karl 
is a brain in a vat. He has an (illusory) experience as of a round thing. He 
does not exhibit physical bodily movements. But he  attempts to behave as if 
a round thing is present, and he has  experiences as of so behaving. Hence, by 
the humanity constraint and the behavior-rationalization principle and the 
other constitutive principles, he counts as having the (false) occurrent belief 
that a round thing is present. Indeed, maybe “round” in Karl’s language gets 
its content directly from the content of his (hallucinatory) experiences, by way 
of his accepting something like “round is  that shape,” while demonstrating an 
uninstantiated shape property presented by his experience (see Speaks 2011 
for an interesting discussion). And maybe the sentence “2+2=4” in Karl’s lan-
guage gets a certain arithmetical content, thanks to its use and “inferential 
role” as well as considerations of naturalness. And maybe Karl counts as occur-
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rently believing this content, on a certain occasion, by virtue of accepting and 
understanding this sentence. 33 
 On my view, contrary to proponents of CP-determination (§1), there is 
no non-sensory phenomenal property that is alone necessarily suﬃ  cient for 
believing  that two plus two equals four , or  that there is a picture on the wall behind 
one . Rather, the contents of beliefs and desires are always determined by (i) a 
cluster of actual and dispositional facts about his past and present  sensory expe-
riences (including what sentences he accepts and their patterns of use), and (ii) 
his links to the environment (if such there be). 
 (iii) Finally, phenomenal functionalism entails the following version of 
the core thesis of the phenomenal intentionality program that phenomenol-
ogy is the  source of all intentionality: necessarily, if a creature has never had 
the capacity for experiences (and does not belong to a community with such 
a capacity), it does not  determinately stand in the belief or desire relation to 
particular contents (as I take it that we at least  sometimes do). Phenomenology 
is at least the source of all  determinate intentionality. To see this, imagine a 
community of zombies who have no experiences but who otherwise resemble 
us as much as possible. According to phenomenal functionalism,  since the 
zombies have no experiential evidence, the all-important humanity principle can-
not kick in to make it the case that deviant interpretations are mistaken . So, if we 
allow that zombies have beliefs at all, there is always massive indeterminacy 
concerning what their contents are. Many  assert that phenomenology is the 
source of determinate intentionality; phenomenal functionalism  explains 
why this is so. 34 
 I ﬁ nd the source thesis to be independently plausible. Here is an argument. 
An ideal interpreter given only the fundamental, third-person physical facts 
about a zombie that entirely lacks sensory experiences would not be able to 
deduce that they have beliefs and desires that determinately possess some con-
tents and not others. Since the zombie lacks a rich phenomenal life, the ideal 
interpreter would have no way of ruling out “deviant interpretations.” I think 
that this epistemic gap provides  some evidence that any such insentient system 
in fact  has no determinate beliefs and desires. 35 By contrast, if an ideal inter-
preter had access to the much  richer set of basic facts concerning a sentient 
creature like Karl (including his ﬁ rst-person sensory experiences together with 
their rich, determinate intentional contents), he clearly could a priori deduce 
that he has at least  some beliefs and desires with determinate contents. 
 Phenomenal functionalism, then, has many virtues. However, while it might 
avoid “the problem of evidence” for Lewis’s theory, it does not dodge another 
overlooked problem for that theory (Pautz 2010a: 55). Like Lewis’s theory, it 
appeals to the nebulous notion of a “best interpretation.” Just what makes an 
interpretation “best”? Until this question is answered, phenomenal function-
alism is incomplete. 
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 5.  Conclusion 
 h e CP-determination thesis is mistaken. Instead, reﬂ ection on various thought-
experiments suggests that all intentionality is entirely grounded in functional facts 
as well as sensory and perceptual facts, which on my view are richly intentional and 
irreducible. h e question is how all intentionality is grounded in such facts. I have 
just sketched an answer to this question, namely  phenomenal functionalism , but it is 
programmatic. David Chalmers, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Jeﬀ  Speaks have proposed 
views in the vicinity. 36 In any case, I think one thing we have learned is that it is not 
enough to simply maintain that “phenomenology grounds the contents of occur-
rent beliefs and desires,” as many proponents of CP-determination do. h ose of us 
sympathetic to the phenomenal intentionality program need a systematic theory 
that tells us  how phenomenology grounds content. 
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 Notes 
 1 .  In Pautz (2006) and (2010b) I characterize the reductive externalist program in terms 
of a generic “tracking relation” which can be spelled out in various ways. Kriegel (in his 
2011 and in this volume) characterizes the program in similar terms. 
 2 .  For phenomenal externalism, see Dretske (1995), Hill (2009), Lycan (2001), and Tye 
(2000). 
 3 .  See Quine (1960) and Kripke (1982). “Kripkenstein” refers to an imaginary proponent of 
the views that Kripke attributes (some think wrongly) to Wittgenstein. 
 4 .  My “phenomenology ﬁ rst” slogan is inspired by Williamson’s (2000) “knowledge ﬁ rst” slo-
gan. Williamson holds that knowledge plays a foundational role in the epistemic domain 
and that it is (at least conceptually) irreducible. Likewise, proponents of the phenomenal 
intentionality program hold that phenomenology plays a foundational role in the mental 
domain and appear at least open to the view that it is (ontologically) irreducible. 
 5 .  In Pautz (2008), I reject prioritism but defend “integrativism” (in the sensory domain). 
Chalmers (2008), Mendelovici (2010), and Kriegel (2011: 63) defend the same view. 
Likewise, in number of papers (2006, 2010a, forthcoming) I reject the standard 
intuition-based, armchair arguments for phenomenal internalism (for example, Horgan, 
Tienson, and Graham 2004). But I also defend empirical arguments for a version of phe-
nomenal internalism and against the reductive externalist program. For discussion 
of the empirical arguments for phenomenal internalism, see Chalmers (2005), Cohen 
(2009: 81–88), Hill (2012), and Tye and Cutter (2011). 
 6 .  I will ignore  degrees of belief and desire. (Would advocates of CP-determination say that 
in some cases these too are  constituted by non-sensory feel, rather than functional role?) 
 7 .  For this point, see Lewis (1994: 425) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007: 240). 
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 8 .  See Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2007, 2009) and Horgan and Graham (2010). 
 9 .  h e acquaintance model is in any case too simple (Pautz 2011). For instance, it has dif-
ﬁ culty explaining why we have immediate introspective justiﬁ cation for believing some 
 complex propositions about our experiences but not others (the “scope problem”); it also 
cannot explain the  graded character of immediate introspective justiﬁ cation. 
 10 .  For the argument, see Pautz 2010a: sect. 7. I argue there against internalist reductions of 
the “consciousness relation” (Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2004) call it the “acquain-
tance relation”), but the argument generalizes to internalist reductions intentional rela-
tions more generally. Goﬀ  (2012) also expresses skepticism about reductive internalist 
theories of phenomenal intentionality; however, unlike me, he does not develop an argu-
ment based on the unavailability of internalist reductions of dyadic intentional  relations , 
which I think is crucial. 
 11 .  Even if he is a “non-relationist” about intentional states and indeed rejects the existence 
of intentional contents and other abstract objects (Kriegel 2011: chap. 3), the propo-
nent of biological CP-determination must recognize the existence of  some mental rela-
tions, namely mental relations to  concrete items such as  x has a thought that is accurate with 
respect to existing concrete scenario y . If he accepts that such relations supervene on the 
totality of physical facts about the world, and if he wants to avoid a primitivist view, he 
would at least need an account of  these relations in purely physical, non-mental terms. 
 12 .  For the point that the only kinds of functional properties that might determine inten-
tionality (and hence phenomenal intentionality, if such there be) are non-intrinsic and 
involve relations to the environment or behavior, see especially Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson (2007: 240). Kriegel (2011: 246) claims that his favored functionalist theory 
of phenomenal intentionality  is compatible with the intrinsicness claim. But since 
Kriegel (2011: 73) explains phenomenal intentionality in terms of our states having 
the Dretskean function to indicate various externally instantiated response-dependent 
properties, and since Dretskean functions always require history (a non-intrinsic aﬀ air), 
this is unclear. See Pautz (2010b: 351ﬀ ) for more discussion. 
 13 .  For discussion of the identity view, see Pautz (2008: 269), Pitt (2009), Mendelovici (2010), 
Kriegel (2011: 63). h is view entails that slight diﬀ erences in cognitive phenomenology 
between individuals (as it might be, between two people who say “Aristotle was smart”) 
would entail that they entertain slightly diﬀ erent “narrow” contents, even if they might 
entertain the same “wide content” (see Montague 2010 for this point). 
 14 .  According to the kind of view I will sketch in §4, all facts about beliefs and desires reduce 
to clusters of functional facts and  sensory facts, but sensory facts are not in turn reduc-
ible to physical-functional facts. So my own view requires  physical-sensory danglers : 
brute bridge principles connecting the physical with the sensory. My hope is that the 
correlations between the physical and the sensory are systematizable, so that only a 
handful of physical-sensory danglers will be required. My “simplicity” objection to 
CP-determination is that it is  even more complex: it requires, not only physical-sensory 
danglers, but a whole slew of physical-cognitive danglers. h at is a point against it. As we 
shall see, I have additional objections to CP-determination, which are independent of my 
present appeal to simplicity. 
 15 .  Indeed, elsewhere (Pautz 2010b: 351ﬀ ) I argue that Kriegel’s (2011: 176, note 30) par-
ticular naturalistic theory of phenomenal intentionality (a higher-order tracking theory, 
where the tracked properties are  response-dependent properties ) faces serious problems of 
detail  in addition to the usual problems, such as Kripke’s plus-quus problem and Quine’s 
inscrutability problem. 
 16 .  h e proponent of CP-determination might grant that a wide range of bizarre separa-
tion cases involving a given cognitive phenomenal property are possible (not just the 
Charlie case, but the baby case discussed later), but insist that across these cases it deter-
mines the same narrow content. h is is what Siewert (2011) calls “the part of what is 
thought that is fully determined by [cognitive] phenomenal character.” h e proponent 
of CP-determination might suggest that my separation argument only shows that this 
is not a content of the sort proposed by Horgan and Tienson and Strawson that can be 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/12/12, NEWGEN
11_Kriegel_Ch11.indd   228 10/12/2012   9:30:00 PM
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? 229
captured in ordinary language and that involves ordinary concepts like  picture or  two or 
 plus . (h anks to David Chalmers and Angela Mendelovici here.) But if he cannot even  ges-
ture at some speciﬁ cation of them, we have no reason to believe there are such contents. 
 17 .  My claim that there are sensory-functional constraints on belief and desire does not 
amount to any crude behaviorism or functionalism; for instance, it is obviously quite 
compatible with the claim that Strawson’s (2010) weather watchers could have beliefs 
and desires. 
 18 .  While I think that there are holistic a priori sensory-functional constraints on cognitive 
intentionality, I do not think that there are holistic a priori functional constraints of any 
kind on  sensory intentionality (or at least those aspects of sensory intentionality ﬁ xed by 
sensory phenomenology). See Pautz (2010c: 271). In my view, this is an important diﬀ er-
ence between cognitive intentionality and sensory intentionality. 
 19 .  Horgan and Tienson in one place (2002: 526) appear to accept  qualiﬁ ed CP-determination: 
necessarily, if an individual has a certain cognitive phenomenal property  and “has a suf-
ﬁ ciently rich network of actual and possible phenomenal/intentional states,” then the 
individual has a thought with a certain narrow content (for example,  there is a picture on 
the wall , or  two plus two equals four ). Unfortunately, they do not explain what this means 
or why they say it. In any case, my Charlie case and my baby case are counterexamples 
even to qualiﬁ ed CP-determination. For Charlie and the baby  do have a rich network of 
phenomenal/intentional states in addition to the relevant cognitive phenomenal proper-
ties (they both have many experiences and thoughts). Yet they do not have the occurrent 
thoughts which are allegedly necessitated by those cognitive phenomenal properties in 
the context of a rich network of phenomenal/intentional states. 
 20 .  Indeed, if CP-determination is true, then there is a possible world where Elmer’s 
sensory-functional duplicate believes there is a  spaceship when he sees a rabbit and 
says “there is a rabbit,” provided then he has the cognitive phenomenal property  S that 
determines that belief. But this intentional diﬀ erence would be unknowable as all the 
sensory-functional facts would suggest in this world he believes that a  rabbit is present 
just as he does in the actual world. 
 21 .  In reply, the proponent of CP-determination might say that the sensory-functional con-
straints on cognitive phenomenal properties are not brute. He might say that they follow 
from the simple fact that having cognitive phenomenal properties amounts to standing 
in certain intentional relations (occurrently believing or occurrently desiring) to cer-
tain contents, together with the fact that there are sensory-functional constraints on 
standing in such relations to contents. But this just passes the buck. h e question then 
becomes “Why are there sensory-functional constraints on standing in such relations to 
contents—in other words, why are such intentional relations necessarily constrained by 
the sensory-functional facts?” Can this be explained by more basic modal truths? (To say 
that it is “part of their essence” would not be an explanation.) 
 22 .  Siewert might oﬀ er a diﬀ erent reply to my separation argument (1998: 286). In one for-
mulation of his claim about cognitive phenomenology determining intentionality, it just 
amounts to the claim that someone who “has, has had, and is disposed to have, expe-
rience with phenomenal character indistinguishable from my own” would have many 
thoughts. But this is compatible with the denial of CP-determination, and indeed with 
the non-existence of cognitive phenomenology. For Siewert’s total phenomenal twin has 
the same  sensory experiences of conducting inferences in inner speech, the same  sensory 
experiences as of his environment, and the same  sensory experiences of acting on the 
world. Maybe it is such clusters of past and future  sensory facts, and not his alleged “cog-
nitive phenomenology,” which determine the contents of his beliefs and desires (see §4). 
 23 .  Terry Horgan tells me that in forthcoming work he (independently) uses absent cognitive 
qualia cases, but unlike me he uses them to argue  for the CP-existence thesis. It is worth 
mentioning that the allegedly “diaphanous” character of experience cannot explain why 
we cannot imagine having profoundly diﬀ erent phenomenal lives due merely to the 
absence of “cognitive experience.” After all, our  visual experiences are arguably diapha-
nous in the sense that we cannot have  object-awareness of them (Tye 2000: 51–52), but 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/12/12, NEWGEN
11_Kriegel_Ch11.indd   229 10/12/2012   9:30:00 PM
p h e n o m e n a l  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y230
this does not prevent us from being able to imagine cases in which they are absent but 
our other types of experiences are the same. For, as Tye points out, even if we are not 
aware of experiences in the sense that we do not have object-awareness of them (we can-
not attend to our experiences in addition to attending to the objects and properties rep-
resented by experiences), we still are certainly quite aware of them in the sense that we 
eﬀ ortlessly have  fact-awareness to the eﬀ ect that they are present. 
 24 .  Everyone should believe in the possibility of absent cognitive qualia cases  when they are 
understood in this way . If you think we  actually fail to possess non-sensory cognitive and 
conative “qualia” over and above sensory qualia, as I am inclined to do, then you will 
think that the absent cognitive qualia case is simply the actual case. On the other hand, 
if you believe we actually possess such “qualia,” then you will also say that the absent 
cognitive qualia case is possible, but that it would diﬀ er phenomenally from the actual 
case in that we would lack qualia we actually enjoy. My argument will be neutral on this 
issue. 
 25 .  By a “disembodied cognitive qualia case,” I do not mean a case in which an individual 
actually has no body or brain. Maybe an individual can have cognitive qualia only if 
he undergoes the right physical processing in the alleged cognitive qualia center of his 
brain. Even in this view, if there are cognitive qualia distinct from all sensory qualia, 
disembodied cognitive qualia cases should be possible in my sense. For there might be a 
very inactive brain which only ever undergoes activity in the cognitive qualia center but 
no other neural area. According to proponents of CP-determination, such an individual 
would have cognitive experiences but no other experiences, including visual experiences 
of the world or his body. (Compare: someone might only have auditory qualia throughout 
his lifetime.) 
 26 .  In my view,  two functionalist theories of mental intentionality can be extracted from 
Lewis. First, there is the  best interpretation account described in the text. It uses  only two 
or three general principles . And it does not necessarily provide  functional deﬁ nitions of our 
names for the belief and desire relation (or of the inﬁ nitely many names of particular 
beliefs), anymore than Lewis’s analogous  best system theory of laws of nature provides 
functional deﬁ nitions of names for laws. Second, there is the more familiar  functional 
deﬁ nition account (Lewis 1972: note 13), which  does provides such functional deﬁ nitions, 
based on a folk theory containing a  huge number of speciﬁ c platitudes (for example, “if 
someone tastes something bitter, they have the desire to spit it out”). Here I focus on 
the best interpretation account, because the functional deﬁ nition account faces seri-
ous problems of detail pointed out by Loar (1981: 60). Loar himself (1981: 62) pro-
poses to solve them by explaining the belief relation and the desire relation in terms of 
functions-in-extension, but I think his proposal fails. (Brieﬂ y, there will be inﬁ nitely 
many “bent” functions that satisfy the functional deﬁ nitions; and the proposal also 
faces the usual modal problems with trying to explain relations in terms of sets of their 
actual instances.) 
 27 .  See Lewis (1983) and (1994). Lewis clearly would reject a weak subjective Bayesian inter-
pretation of the humanity constraint. Indeed, he thinks objective Bayesianism is built 
into folk psychology. 
 28 .  In a very helpful discussion, Weatherson (ms) independently suggests that Lewis could 
use his humanity principle to answer Williams (2007). 
 29 .  See Lewis (1983: 375) and (1994: 428). Since Lewis derives the naturalness principle con-
cerning mental content from his more general humanity constraint (which has nothing 
to do with “simplicity”), I do not think Lewis himself could accept Williams’s (2007: sect. 
2) suggestion of deriving the naturalness principle concerning mental content from a 
general principle about simplicity as a theoretical virtue used to decide between theories 
that ﬁ t the data equally well. 
 30 .  Here I am mainly focused on mental content but Lewis (1992) also appeals to natural-
ness in his theory of linguistic content in order to rule out “bent grammars.” Horgan and 
Graham (2010) raise an intriguing general objection to Lewis’s theory of intentionality: 
what  makes it the case that naturalness enters into the determination of intentionality, 
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either in the mental case or the linguistic case? For instance, by virtue of what does 
naturalness enter into the determination of  linguistic reference (or the semantic value 
relation)? But Lewis has an answer: naturalness helps determine reference because the 
reference relation  just is a relation involving naturalness (the “most natural” grammar) 
among other things: call it the  naturalness-plus relation . Maybe now Horgan and Graham 
will ask for an explanation of the identity between the reference relation and the 
naturalness-plus relation. But I do not think Lewis needs to supply one, because in general 
identities cannot be explained. Of course, it is sensible to ask for an explanation of the 
corresponding  metalinguistic fact: the fact that “reference”  refers to the naturalness-plus 
relation. And here Lewis  can provide an explanation that invokes his own theory of refer-
ence: “reference” bears the  naturalness-plus relation to the naturalness-plus relation. h is 
kind of self-subsumption is not circular in any metaphysical sense (a point repeatedly 
made in the literature spawned by Putnam’s model-theoretic argument). 
 31 .  An alternative solution to the problem of evidence would appeal to Karl’s behavioral dis-
positions. Maybe his behavioral dispositions, together with the behavior-rationalization 
principle, determine the contents of Karl’s immediate perceptual  beliefs . h en, given the 
humanity constraint, the contents of his experiences (and hence, given intentionalism, 
what experiences he has) are those that make those perceptual beliefs rational. But this 
suggestion faces the problem of deviant interpretations (Pautz 2010a: 56–57). Moreover, 
it is at odds with Lewis’s solution to that problem. According to Lewis’s humanity prin-
ciple, Karl’s history of experiences and hence evidence play a crucial role in constitutively 
determining the contents of his beliefs. Given this, what experiences and evidence he has 
cannot in turn be pinned down by his beliefs. h at would be circular. To avoid circularity, 
his experiences and their contents must be determined in a belief-independent way, for 
instance, by causal connections to the world. 
 32 .  On Kriegel’s intriguing and innovative version of  interpretivism about  unconscious inten-
tional states, you have a certain unconscious intentional state iﬀ  (very roughly) you 
are disposed to get a  fully informed ideal interpreter in ideal conditions to interpret you as 
having that state (for full details, see Kriegel 2011: chap. 4). h ere are important dif-
ferences between phenomenal functionalism and Kriegel’s theory. First, phenomenal 
functionalism is more general, since it is meant to apply to all  conscious intentional states 
as well, with the exception of sensory experiences. (Kriegel tells me that if he followed 
me in rejecting the idea that such conscious intentional states are constituted by cog-
nitive phenomenology, then he would take a similar view.) Second, Kriegel’s theory is 
observer-dependent and so faces the usual prima facie counterexamples. Consider a 
community of  killer believers , who have beliefs but are disposed to emit rays (or whatever) 
that destroy (ideal or other) interpreters when they are about to become informed about 
them. (h is is analogous to Saul Kripke’s unpublished case of  killer yellow .) Phenomenal 
functionalism avoids such problems because it does not appeal to an ideal interpreter. 
h ere are objective, observer-independent facts about your (conscious and unconscious) 
beliefs and desires and the semantic values of your expressions, because there are objec-
tive, observer-independent facts about what the best interpretation is (or, in case of ties, 
the set of interpretations tied for best). 
 33 .  On Lewis’s own view (1974: 117), mental content is always prior to linguistic content. 
By contrast, as my examples here suggest, I think that in some cases (for example, per-
ceptual content) mental content is prior to linguistic content, while in other cases (for 
example, arithmetical content) linguistic content is prior to mental content. However, 
as Lewis notes, his basic theory (and hence my modiﬁ ed version of his theory) is in fact 
compatible with a mixed view of this kind (he calls it “method 3”). 
 34 .  Do our zombie twins count as having any beliefs or desires at all, despite not having 
the capacity for experience? Many would say they do. By contrast, I ﬁ nd it intuitive that 
they do not. (Smithies (ms) develops an interesting argument against Zombie belief; 
but it relies on the CP-determination thesis that I have argued against.) h is may be a 
semantic issue, since we agree about the fundamental facts of the case. However, even if 
we allow that the zombies have beliefs and desires (or beliefs* and desires*), the crucial 
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point is that phenomenal functionalism entails that they cannot have the same beliefs 
and desires that we have (since they lack acquaintance with conscious states and sensible 
qualities), and that it is at best radically indeterminate what their true contents are. 
 35 .  In response to this “epistemic gap” argument, those who think that zombies might have 
beliefs and desires that determinately possess certain contents might reply that it has 
such determinate beliefs and desires even if I am right that an ideal interpreter could 
not deduce them a priori from the fundamental physical facts about its situation. In 
other words, they might advocate a posteriori physicalism about the alleged determinate 
beliefs and desires of zombies. Soames (1998) takes a view of this kind about our  own 
beliefs and desires. But to make this credible one would have to least sketch physicalist 
theories (perhaps  a posteriori physicalist theories) of the belief relation and the desire 
relation which explain  how the purely non-phenomenal, non-intentional physical facts 
about the zombies determine that it comes to determinately bear these relations to some 
contents rather than others. h e history of failed attempts to sketch such theories pro-
vides strong grounds for doubting that one can be provided. 
 36 .  Schwitzgebel (2002) defends “phenomenal dispositionalism.” Speaks (2011) proposes 
a Horwichian use theory, supplemented with facts about the contents of perceptual 
experiences. Chalmers (2008) ﬂ irts with a “combined view” on which belief content 
is grounded in sensory/perceptual intentionality and inferential role. Unlike these 
authors, I provide a  general analysis (in terms of the notion of a “best interpretation”) of 
what it is to stand in the belief relation or the desire relation to an arbitrary proposition. 
h is provides a rule for going from the sensory-functional facts about any individual 
to what the individual believes and desires. I think that such a general algorithm is 
needed to explain how it is that an ideal interpreter, merely on the basis of his grasp of 
the concepts of belief and desire (and other relevant concepts), would in principle have 
the ability to work out any individual’s beliefs and desires, given the sensory and func-
tional facts about that individual. Such abilities are not miracles (Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson 2007: 165–166). 
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